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I. INTRODUCTION/ INDIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
AND STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA 
India is upgrading its armed forces as it competes with China and Pakistan for 
regional power.  India has made concerted efforts to upgrade its intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike, and missile defense capabilities 
to improve its influence as a regional military power.  However, it is in the U.S. 
economic, military, and political interest to maintain stability in South Asia.  India is the 
world’s largest democracy, which is moving towards greater economic freedom and is 
committed to political freedom.  India, along with the United States, shares an interest in 
fighting terrorism, and Pakistan is a vital partner of the United States in the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT).1  India and Pakistan also are nuclear states that have had a history 
of wars against each other.  Both countries, under the protection of the nuclear umbrella 
can be expected to challenge each other as what Glenn Snyder identified as the strategic 
stability/tactical instability paradox.  It is therefore important for the United States to 
understand the potential consequences of India’s conventional military modernization on 
the stability in the region.  This thesis argues that if India continues its military 
modernization efforts, it will likely upset the conventional balance of power in South 
Asia as it increases the military capabilities gap between itself and Pakistan, leading to a 
regional arms race and increased instability in the region as a consequence of lowering of 
the nuclear threshold by Pakistan. 
India has made concerted efforts in recent years to modernize its ISR, precision 
strike, and missile defense capabilities.  These efforts have been due to the potential 
threat from China and Pakistan, the lessons learned during the Kargil crisis, and from 
observing the successes of the U.S. military in its operations during the Gulf War.  
However, India’s continuing efforts to upgrade its military capabilities will threaten the 
security environment and instigate an arms race in the region.   
 
1 U.S. Department of State website, “Bureau of South Asian Affairs,” November 2004, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm, accessed on 19 February 2005. 
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What form the instability will take is yet to be determined.  One of the key 
requirements for stability is the prevention of preventive war.2  For example, if State A 
maintains a military advantage over State B but fears State B’s growing military 
capability, it conducts a preventive strike against State B to prevent it from increasing its 
military capability to threaten State A in the future.  This would be a condition of 
instability since State A could conduct a preventive war.  In the case of India and 
Pakistan, the question that needs to be asked is will India, under the strategic stability of 
nuclear weapons and with an increasing conventional superiority compared to Pakistan, 
be threatened by a Pakistan insistent on an arms race and be encouraged to conduct a 
preventive war against Pakistan?  It is possible that India may believe that it can achieve 
a victory against Pakistan at an acceptable cost given its increasing ISR, precision strike 
and missile defense capabilities.  Or will Pakistan, under what Glenn Snyder identified as 
the strategic stability/tactical instability paradox, be encouraged to conduct low-scale 
wars under the protection of nuclear weapons against what it considers to be a threatening 
and increasingly powerful India - as it did during the Kargil Conflict?3  As Waltz stated, 
“because nuclear weapons limit escalation, they may tempt countries to fight small 
wars.”4  In a South Asia that has bigger and better weapons, an arms race in a nuclear 
environment is likely to cause instability in the region.   
The causes and affects of India’s military modernization need to be evaluated to 
identify the possible responses by Pakistan, and what effect those responses will signify 
for the region.  Therefore, the second chapter of this thesis presents the “why” behind 
India’s efforts to modernize its military.  This chapter presents India’s perceived threats 
and the reasons behind its motivations to pursue the modernization of its ISR, precision 
strike, and missile defense.  The third chapter presents the “what” – the efforts India has 
undertaken through upgrade and acquisition to modernize its ISR, precision strike, and 
missile defense capabilities.  The fourth chapter evaluates Pakistan’s responses and 
presents some likely responses in the future to India’s military modernization.  The fifth 
 
2 Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), 
91. 
3  Waltz and Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 97. 
4   Ibid, 122. 
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and final chapter is the conclusion and provides some recommendations for U.S. policy 
makers on how to prevent instability in the region. 
 
A. MOTIVATIONS 
Chapter II evaluates India’s threat perceptions in order to understand the 
motivations behind India’s pursuit to modernize its ISR, precision strike, and missile 
defense capabilities.  Indians believe that the potential threat to their security will come 
from either of their two nuclear neighbors, China or Pakistan, or through a proxy war 
conducted by Pakistan and it is this perceived threat that has driven India to pursue the 
modernization of its ISR, precision strike and missile defense.5  Indians also believe that 
as a growing economic power they have to protect their growing interests in the region.6  
Therefore, it is essential for the Indians to develop a military commensurate with its 
interests. 
India’s economy has been growing at a steady pace since it undertook economic 
reforms in the early 1990s.  And as the economy has grown, so have its imports and 
exports, and the country’s reliance on energy sources.  It is important to India to be able 
to protect these interests for its economic security.  This has been a drive behind India’s 
overall military modernization.  However, for reasons behind India’s efforts to modernize 
and upgrade its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense in particular, India’s threat 
perceptions need to be evaluated. 
India views China as its competitor both economically and as a potential regional 
power.  Indians believe that as China’s economic capabilities grow so do its superpower 
aspirations.  Indians cite that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been modernizing 
its military over the past decade and can pose a serious threat to India’s security in the 
future.  China is set to add some 300 Su-30, 500 J-7/J-8 II/FC-1/J-10, Airborne Warning 
and  Control  System (AWACS), modern Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) like the S-300  
 
5 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2002-2003, pg 2, 
http://www.mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html, accessed on 17 February 2005. 
6 Interview with CDR P.K. Ghosh, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, on 10 February 
2005. 
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and a variety of Cruise Missiles in large numbers, and the Indians perceive this as a threat 
to their security and a potentially major shift towards China for the power balance in the 
region.7   
Given that India and China still have disputed territories along their borders and 
both countries have fought each other in the past, Indians believe there is a distinct 
possibility that the two countries may go to war against each other in the future.  In order 
to deter a military confrontation with China, India is attempting to pursue military parity 
with the Chinese in hopes to deter the Chinese from going to war with India and instead 
persuade them to pursue negotiations.   
Tensions between India and Pakistan have been high throughout their existence.  
The two countries have been to war on three different occasions, and have had other near-
wars.  As recently as 1999, after the two countries had conducted nuclear tests a year 
earlier, India and Pakistan were involved in an armed conflict in the Kargil sector of 
Kashmir.  And in 2002, following the attacks on the Indian parliament in December 
2001, the two countries again came close to an all out war.  India also holds Pakistan 
responsible for waging a proxy war through Islamist extremists in Kashmir.  
Indians perceive Pakistan as an unstable country that has been through several 
military coups and government overthrows and views Pakistan’s military dominated 
government to be spending a disproportionately high amount of money on its military.  
Having an undemocratic neighbor with the military at the helm will continue to be a 
concern for India.  India believes that Pakistan will continue to finance “terrorists” who 
will continue to threaten Indian security, and is seeking to find conventional space in 
which it might exercise punitive measures to deter such proxy warfare.8
Therefore, to prevent future wars with either China or Pakistan, Indians believe 
they need to possess the military capability to be able to dissuade and deter their potential 
adversaries, and to effectively counter the insurgency in Kashmir.  In order to accomplish 
this, India is modernizing its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities.   
 
7 V. Phadke, “Response Options: Future of Indian Air Power Vision 2020,” Strategic Analysis, 24, no. 
10 (January 2001), 4. 
8 Interview with Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.), Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 7 
February 2005. 
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B. MODERNIZATION 
 Chapter III focuses on the efforts being undertaken by the Indian military to 
modernize its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense, and the capabilities they provide 
to the Indian military. 
 India is indigenously developing and acquiring foreign weapons systems to deter 
aggressive actions from both China and Pakistan.  To improve its ISR capabilities, India 
is focusing on the Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 
surveillance radars, weapon locating radars, maritime surveillance aircraft, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and satellites.  For precision strike, India’s efforts are geared 
towards acquiring the Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000-5, upgrading the Jaguar and the MiG-27, 
acquiring and developing anti-tank guided weapon systems, guided artillery weapons, 
multi-purpose guided weapons, and the Rafael litening targeting pod.  To develop an 
anti-missile defense capability, as well as to continually improve its conventional air 
defense, India is focusing on the Barak anti-missile missile system, Green Pine anti-
missile system, Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile launchers, and the S-300 PMU air 
defense system.9
 The ISR, precision strike, and missile defense systems mentioned above are 
expected to provide India with the ability to dissuade and deter its potential attackers by 
helping achieve a military edge over Pakistan and by helping bridge a quality gap 
between the Chinese military and the Indian military.  The modern technology is 
expected to improve India’s capabilities to survey the potential threats to its security and 
respond to them in a timely, effective, and efficient manner.  The ISR systems will 
provide an improved capability to detect and track enemy infiltration, and will also 
provide improved queuing for patrolling assets to engage the enemy.  Having precision 
strike capability will then allow the engaging assets to effectively and efficiently engage 
and neutralize the enemy with a high degree of success.  In the case of a missile attack, 
India’s future missile defense capability is expected to defend against a potential nuclear 
attack.  Having an improved ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capability is 
 
9  Lt. General RK Jasbir Singh, PVSM, ed. Indian Defense Yearbook 2004, (Dehra Dun, India: Natraj 
Publishers, 2004). 
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expected to dissuade and deter a potential enemy by ensuring its detection and 
punishment, and a successful defense against a missile attack is expected to deter the 
enemy form launching an attack in the first place. 
 
C. PAKISTAN’S RESPONSE  
 This chapter analyzes Pakistan’s perspective on India’s military modernization 
and its likely reactions. The increase in military spending by India has been a direct 
concern for Pakistan, and it is likely to view India’s recent modernization efforts as a 
threat to its security. India’s military modernization program has led to a growing 
disparity between the Indian and Pakistani conventional military capabilities.  If India 
pursues its policy to achieve technical superiority in ISR, precision targeting and missile 
defense, this will provide India the capability to effectively locate and efficiently destroy 
strategically important targets in Pakistan and congruently defend against a strike from 
Pakistan.  India’s new-found ISR capability, through its acquisition of the Phalcon 
AWACS, will provide India with the ability to locate targets deep inside Pakistan’s 
territory, and direct India’s superior aircraft, like the Su-30 and the Mirage 2000-5, with 
their air-to-air and precision strike capabilities onto those targets.  Possessing advanced 
precision strike capability will ensure high probability of kill, and put Pakistan at a 
significant disadvantage.  The result of this growing divergence in the two countries’ 
conventional capabilities will be either a regional arms race – as Pakistan desperately 
attempts to keep pace with India in order to deter a preventive strike from India, and/or a 
lowering of the nuclear threshold for Pakistan – as it fails to keep up the conventional 
arms race with an economically powerful India and therefore needs to rely on its nuclear 
arsenal for a deterrent.  Additionally, if Pakistan feels it needs to rely on its nuclear 
arsenal for its survival and India is successful in obtaining a functional missile defense 
capability, it will deliver a significant blow to Pakistan’s perception of its security.  If 
India can defend itself against the only recourse Pakistan has, i.e., its ability to deliver 
nuclear missiles on Indian targets, then Pakistan will be left with only one choice – to 
undertake a massive nuclear missile build-up in order to possess the ability to saturate 
India’s missile defenses and still retain its nuclear deterrent.  In any case, none of the 
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potential scenarios are a welcoming possibility for a future in a region the United States 
would like to see stable for reasons already mentioned. 
 
D. CONCLUSION CHAPTER 
 This chapter provides the results based on the information provided in the 
previous chapters.  Having evaluated the reaction from Pakistan, the conclusion is that 
the end result of India’s modernization of its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense 
capabilities, will be an increase in the destabilization of the region.  It also presents an 
explanation, based on the realism argument, for the continuing hostilities between India 
and Pakistan.  According to this argument the India–Pakistan conflict is the direct 
consequence of the imbalance of power between the two states and Pakistan’s insecurity 
about this imbalance. 
An India-China war is not likely in the near-term, but there is a possibility of an 
India-Pakistan war in the near future.  For example, India claims to be modernizing its 
military equipment specifically geared towards a threat from China.  India’s acquisitions 
of sophisticated ISR equipment, precision strike, and missile defense, and even its 
recently acquired capability to conduct air-to-air refueling can be justified to be China-
specific.  India claims it needs to match China’s modernization efforts and therefore must 
obtain SU-30MKIs with refueling capability to be able to reach China’s heartland.  Using 
China as a justification for procuring SU-30MKIs and stationing them out of reach of 
Pakistan’s capability to threaten the assets provides India with a capability to conduct 
missions into Pakistan while minimizing the threat to their high-value assets.  Even if 
India’s military upgrades are specifically geared towards China, they can also be targeted 
against Pakistan.  What it will lead to is Pakistan feeling greater sense of insecurity due to 
India’s improving military capabilities due to its efforts to protect itself against the 
perceived threat form China.  And for now, India does not have the capability to conduct 
a successful war against China, but it does have the potential to severely hurt Pakistan.  It 
is this threat to Pakistan, and its potential response to the threat caused by India’s military 
modernization (whether China specific or not), that has the potential to cause instability 
in the region.  And this potential India-Pakistan threat to the stability in South Asia will 
be the focus of this thesis. 
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 The conclusion presents an explanation for the continuing hostilities between 
India and Pakistan.  According to the Realism argument, the India–Pakistan conflict is 
the direct consequence of the imbalance of power between the two states and Pakistan’s 
insecurity about this imbalance.  Hence, the more sophisticated military equipment India 
obtains and the greater the gap widens between the Indian military and the Pakistani 
military, the more threatened Pakistan will become and the more actions it will take in 
order to increase its security vis-à-vis India.  This will lead to greater instability in the 
region.  As Indian analyst R. Rajagopalan, says, “The persistence of the conflict is a 
consequence of the persistence of this imbalance and of Pakistan’s attempts to correct 
it.”10
 The Indian Armed Forces’ superiority in strength and technological capabilities 
poses an increasingly serious threat to the security of Pakistan.  In light of India’s 
growing conventional military superiority, Pakistan has needed to explore options to 
achieve a strategic balance with India.  Pakistan has sought this balance by pursuing a 
nuclear weapons program.  “Pakistan launched its nuclear program to establish a 
deterrent against India and to compensate for India’s conventional military 
advantages”.11  This is one example of a drastic measure that Pakistan had to employ to 
maintain parity with India’s growing military capability and bolster its own deterrent. 
 Pakistan remains fearful of India’s regional and global power aspirations and has 
maintained close security ties with China in an effort to balance India’s conventional 
superiority and nuclear capability.  Pakistan has procured several weapon systems from 
China and will likely continue to do so as long as the Indian military remains 
significantly more capable than Pakistan’s.   
 If India continues its build-up and upgrading of its military equipment, Pakistan 
either will enter into an arms race and increase its conventional military equipment or 
continue to rely on its nuclear weapons and the option to initiate a nuclear strike to 
maintain a deterrent against an Indian military attack.  Rather than provide security to 
 
10 R. Rajagopalan, “Neorealist Theory and the India-Pakistan Conflict–II,” Strategic Analysis, 22, no. 
10 (January 1999), 1. 
11 Abidi, Zawar. “Threat Reduction in South Asia.” Date Unknown. 
www.stimson.org/southasia/pubs.cfm?ID=87 accessed 17 February 2005, 4. 
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India, achieving a significantly superior conventional military force compared to Pakistan 



































































                                                
II. WHY IS INDIA MODERNIZING ITS ISR, PRECISION 
STRIKE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES? 
There has been a concerted effort by the Indian military in recent years to 
modernize its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike, and 
missile defense capabilities.  These efforts by the Indian government to modernize its 
military are primarily due to the potential threat from China and Pakistan, from the 
lessons learned by the Indian military from their experience during the Kargil crisis, and 
from observing the success of the U.S. military during the Gulf War.  This chapter will 
present the perspective of why India is modernizing its ISR, precision strike, and missile 
defense capabilities. 
A. THREATS 
For most of its history India has continued to rely on the seemingly impenetrable 
natural boundaries – Himalayas to the north and the Indian Ocean in the peninsular south 
– for its security.  Rarely have they ventured past these boundaries to create a buffer for 
greater security.  This lack of surveillance and reconnaissance has led to invaders 
approaching unchallenged until in vicinity of the center of power, as was the case with 
Babur who fought the decisive battle at Panipat on the outskirts of Delhi.12  Security did 
not become a concern for India until the Kashmir War against Pakistan, following 
independence from Britain.  The Kashmir War demonstrated the need to be able to 
defend against military aggression with adequate capability; however India had basic 
economic issues to deal with at independence.  At its conception India had a chronic 
deficiency in its ability to feed its people.  The Great Bengal Famine had only occurred a 
few years before independence and India was a net importer of food-grain for a couple of 
decades after independence.  The priority at independence according to Nehru was, “the 
ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity.”13  This led to 
 
12 K. Shrivastava, “Indian Army 2020: A Vision Statement on Strategy and Capability,” Strategic 
Analysis 25, no. 6 (September 2001), 2. 
13 Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze. India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. Oxford 
University Press, 1999, 1. 
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a powerful pull towards development at the cost of national defense, since the political 
leaders tended to view the choice as an alternative between development and military.  
This bias on development at the cost of defense was acknowledged by Jawaharlal Nehru 
in a speech in Parliament following a devastating defeat suffered by the Indian military at 
the hands of the Chinese in 1962, “We were anxious to use all the resources we had for 
economic betterment, for industrialisation, and all that.  We were anxious not to spend 
too much on the Army…”14  Until 1962 defense spending was deliberately limited to 1.5 
percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), however, since the war with China the 
money for defense had been forthcoming at an average annual rate of 3.05 percent of the 
GDP for 25 years after 1962.15   
For the foreseeable future, the potential threat to India’s security will come from 
either China or Pakistan.  China is expected to remain India’s primary long-term strategic 
challenge and Pakistan as a short- to medium-term threat.16  Indians perceive Pakistan 
and China as pursuing an anti-India strategy and foresee both countries to pose a military 
threat to India.17  It is the security policies of China and Pakistan that governs India’s 
conventional defense strategy. 
1. China 
Even though China and India have been at relative peace with each other for over 
four decades, Indians believe the Chinese attitude towards India could change as China 
makes strides towards becoming a superpower.  Indians expect China to remain its 
primary strategic challenge politically, economically and militarily.18  The two nations 
are competitors economically as well as potential regional powers.  As China’s economic 
capabilities grow so do its superpower aspirations, and with it China’s military 
capabilities.   
 
14 Jasjit Singh, India’s Defence Spending, 1-3. 
15 Ibid, 22. 
16 K. Kak, “India’s Conventional Defence: Problems and Prospects,” Strategic Analysis, 22, no. 11 
(February 1999), 18. 
17 V. K. Shrivastava, “Indian Air Force in the Years Ahead: An Army View,” Strategic Analysis, 25, 
no. 8 (November 2001), 4. 
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The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been modernizing its military over the 
past decade and can pose a serious threat to India in the future.  China has initiated steps 
to establish new joint command structures, and has set in motion a series of measures 
designed to turn its armed forces into a modern juggernaut. China has initiated a doctrinal 
shift from "people's war under modern conditions" to "limited war under high-technology 
conditions".19  Indians fear that China will continue to pose a strategic challenge to India.  
China’s military modernization is set to add some 300 Su-30, 500 J-7/J-8 II/FC-1/J-10, 
AWACs, modern SAMs like the S-300s and a variety of Cruise Missiles in large 
numbers, which will shift the air power balance in the region.20  Even though China’s 
efforts may be concentrated against Taiwan, Indians fear that China’s capabilities may be 
employed against India in the future. 
Indians believe that China’s strategic game plan is to keep India confined to South 
Asia.21  To India’s concern, as stated in the October 1999 Rand Report for the United 
States Air Force, is that China is not a satisfied power and refuses to abandon the 
principle of power.  Given that India and China still have disputed territories along their 
borders and both countries have fought each other in the past, there is a distinct 
possibility that the two countries may go to war against each other in the future.  Indians 
believe it is unlikely that China will relinquish claims on vast tracts of disputed territory 
along its border with India and in order to deter a military confrontation with China, India 
must achieve military parity with the Chinese.  Therefore, the goal for the Indian military 
is to deter the Chinese from going to war with India and instead persuade them to pursue 
negotiations.  Indian officials believe that their military force structure must be focused 
for a limited conventional war with China under high technology conditions.  China has 
been upgrading its military technology and the Indians want to keep the technology gap 
from widening further, and hence want to pursue a military modernization policy to 
achieve parity with China.  To the Indians the PLA objectives of gaining initiative by 
striking first and winning victory through elite troops indicate offensive intent.  This 
 
19 Shrivastava, “Indian Air Force in the Years Ahead,” 4. 
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combined with People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) transformation into a 
modern force capable of projecting force beyond mainland China is of significant 
security concern to the Indians.22  In order to deter China from attacking, India is 
pursuing improved ISR – in order to identify and locate the threat, precision strike – for 
targeting capability and accuracy of its missiles, and missile defense – to defend against a 
possible missile attack from China.  
2. Pakistan 
Military tensions between India and Pakistan have been high.  Since the last time 
the two countries fought a war in 1971 they have been involved in an intense acrimony 
over Kashmir, been involved in a low-intensity conflict in the Siachen Glacier region, 
gone through periodic crises over large-scale military exercises, and have participated in 
an armed conflict in the Kargil sector of Kashmir.  Missile tests by both countries, 
including the reciprocated nuclear tests in 1998, have also heightened tensions between 
India and Pakistan.23  
From the Indian perspective, Pakistan has been a relatively unstable country over 
the course of its existence.  There have been several military coups and overthrows of 
governments.  Having an unstable neighbor with the military at the helm will continue to 
be a concern for India.  India and Pakistan have had a history of three wars, crises, and 
conflicts.  Previous attempts at reconciliation – the Nehru-Liaqat agreement, the Simla 
agreement, the Lahore Declaration – have not produced any significant results.  Indians 
believe that for the foreseeable future the Pakistani ruling elite is unlikely to change its 
attitudes and policies towards India, and tensions between the two countries will continue 
to mount.24   
India perceives Pakistan to be spending a disproportionately high amount of 
money on its military in an attempt to maintain parity with the Indian military, and 
blames Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for subversive activities within Indian 
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borders to keep the Indian Army committed and reduce India’s conventional edge against 
Pakistan.25  India feels that in order to strengthen its tenuous national identity and strive 
for equivalence with India, Pakistan will continue to pose a confrontational posture 
against India for the next decade or two.   
India feels threatened from the continuing cooperation between Pakistan and 
China.  India foresees Pakistan to continue to modernize its air power and missiles from 
technology transfers through military cooperation with China.26  Pakistan has enhanced 
its own strategic depth through acquisition of nuclear and IRBM capability with the 
assistance of China, and India expects Pakistan to further strengthen its conventional 
military structures through Chinese assistance.27  
 
B. RIGHT TO ARM 
Along with the perceived threats from China and Pakistan being the drive behind 
India’s desire to modernize its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities, 
Indians also believe that as a growing economic power they have to protect their growing 
interests in the region.28  Therefore, it is essential for the Indians to develop a military 
commensurate with its interests. 
India’s economy has been growing at a steady pace since it undertook economic 
reforms in the early 1990s.  And as the economy has grown, so have its imports and 
exports, and the country’s reliance on energy sources.  It is important to India to be able 
to protect these interests for its economic security.  This has been a drive behind India’s 
overall military modernization.   
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26 Phadke, “Response Options,” 3. 
27 Kak, “India’s Conventional Defence,” 7. 
28 Interview with CDR P.K. Ghosh, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, on 10 February 
2005. 
 16
                                                
C. PREPARING FOR THE THREATS 
1. Dissuade and Deter 
Indians believe the best way to prevent war is through a strong and viable 
defensive posture of dissuasion and a potent and credible counter-offensive capability of 
deterrence.29  Dissuasion implies a powerful defense that imposes significant losses on 
the attacker while limiting the intrusion into the defender’s territory with only minimal 
losses to the defender.  This makes the cost of potential gains for the aggressor extremely 
expensive and makes the whole endeavor seem pointless.  Deterrence is predicated to 
possessing a counter-offensive capability that can inflict unacceptable losses on the 
attacker at a place of the defender’s choosing.  “The mere threat of a counter-offensive 
would deter the aggressor from embarking on changing the status quo. Such a strategy, 
with varying force mixes, is expected to shape force structures and weapon mixes as well. 
It applies both with regard to China and Pakistan.”30   
The 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo air campaign highlighted the role of 
technology in air power.31  India’s military wants to build a strategic deterrence 
capability based on long-range precision strike fighter-bomber aircraft, cruise missiles 
and other land based missiles, and UAVs.  They believe that having these capabilities 
will dissuade potential adversaries from attacking India. 32  Indian military thinking is 
that if India possesses a superior conventional capability than its adversaries, it will 
prevent India’s adversaries from engaging in a war with India.  “The implications of 
deterrence are to physically possess the requisite military capability (not capacity) and 
have the will to employ the same when needed.  The adversary should be in the know on 
both counts.”33  India wants to pursue a doctrine of war prevention through conventional 
deterrence.  To that end, the Indian government has reversed the trend of cuts in defense 
 
29 Kak, “India’s Conventional Defence,” 5. 
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spending and has initiated defense modernization programs.34  India’s victory over 
Pakistan in 1971 was a validation for the maturity of India’s acquired military capabilities 
in the wake of their military defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, and the near 
stalemate with Pakistan in 1965.  Indians believe that having a superior conventional 
military has resulted in the absence of major conventional wars in the region.  
“Dissuasion and deterrence have constituted key components of our defence strategy for 
over two decades… in the history of independent India, the period since 1971 has been 
the longest one when war has not occurred. It could be argued that perhaps the 
sufficiency of our military capabilities may have deterred war.”35  Therefore, the Indians 
want to modernize and maintain a military that is capable of dissuading and deterring 
potential aggressors.   
2. Political Tool 
The military exists to provide the leaders of a state with opportunities to 
accomplish their political goals.  A military should have the means available to 
accomplish its military objectives, and be able to nudge the adversary towards the 
negotiating table.36  Indian leadership believes that if they can create a military force 
overwhelmingly superior than their adversaries’, it will force the adversaries to 
compromise since they will be out matched against the Indian military on a battlefield.  
Indians believe that it is their superior conventional capability that deters the Pakistanis 
from wanting to engage in a conventional war with India. From the Indian perspective it 
is imperative to achieve a military force capable of achieving its military objectives 
against an adversary, act as deterrence to the adversary due to their military capabilities 
and hence provide the politicians with a tool to achieve favorable outcomes during 
negotiations.  Indians believe there is a trend towards military being used as an 
instrument for political purposes without an armed contest.37
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3. Technology/Modernization 
Influence of technology has altered the way wars have been fought throughout 
human history.  Technological innovations have helped evolve new methods of engaging 
on the battlefield.  Innovations in the use of catapults, horses, gunpowder have had 
tremendous affects on the way wars are fought and have had a significant affect on the 
course of human history.  The twentieth century saw the continuing quest by mankind to 
fight wars with the assistance of modern technology.  
The Indian military intends to raise its technological sophistication.  They see the 
revolution in military affairs (RMA) as the future of war.  The incorporation of emerging 
technologies into modern militaries is changing the nature of war.  New technologies are 
increasing battlefield transparency, speeding up the process of making command 
decisions, and are enabling pinpoint destruction of targets at long ranges.38  Conventional 
war with high technology platforms and weapons has become the object of desire for 
India since the Gulf War in 1991.39  They are seeking capabilities in long range air 
power, airborne early warning, force multipliers, precision guided munitions, and UAVs 
among others.  Success in the future conventional wars will depend upon possessing 
greater combat effectiveness potential, state-of-the-art reconnaissance, surveillance, 
target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities and domination offered by technology-intensive 
force multipliers.40
The Indian military foresees the need to acquire and modernize capabilities in 
ISR, precision strike, and missile defense. ISR will provide the Indian military with the 
capability to successfully detect the enemy forces and provide India with the ability to 
engage the enemy before he invades India.  Precision strike will provide Indian military 
with an ability to parsimoniously target and destroy the enemy’s high value assets and 
also provide the forces on the ground with close air support (CAS) and help them achieve 
their tactical goals while minimizing threat to the troops on the ground.  The events 
during Kargil proved to the Indians the impact of air power in support of ground troops. 
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Having a functioning missile defense capability will provide India with ability to 
minimize the threat its own targets and potentially defend its cities from a nuclear attack.  
Indians believe that having a strong military is vital for providing defense for its people 
and for providing India with stature.   
 
D. KARGIL LESSONS LEARNED 
One of the first steps towards achieving a military force that is capable of taking a 
proactive stance by taking the fight to the enemy instead of fighting on their own territory 
is having timely and reliable intelligence.  India has not had a good track record of 
providing good intelligence, as was evident by a lack of indications and warning (I&W) 
during the events leading up to the Kargil crisis.  Kargil was an example of an 
intelligence failure on the part of the Indians.  Both sides had been exchanging fire in 
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) for years and were aware of each other’s intentions.  
However, Indian intelligence analysts, officials and officers were taken by surprise by 
Pakistan when Pakistani forces succeeded in infiltrating undetected into the disputed 
territory of Kargil.41   
Indian military maintained patrols in the mountains after the positions were 
vacated for the winter to detect any Pakistani activity.  On the first sign of any such 
activity, aerial reconnaissance would be established.  India also maintained civilian and 
military intelligence organizations to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance in the 
Kargil region.   Organizations like the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis 
Wing (R&AW), Border Security Force (BSF), Directorate General of Military 
Intelligence (DGMI) that had communications intelligence (COMINT), human 
intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and electronic intelligence 
(ELINT) assets at their disposal.  In spite of all these assets and organizations, Indian 
reconnaissance efforts failed to detect large scale Pakistani intrusions into the Kargil 
region.  “Pakistan had begun to move units into the region in December 1998 and by 
March 1999 Pakistanis had established 132 posts inside Indian Territory covering an area 
 
41 J. Wirtz and S. Rana, “Surprise at the Top of the World,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: Causes 
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of 100km in width to 7-15km in depth.”42  The Kargil Review Committee, established to 
investigate the failure of Indian intelligence during the events leading up to the Kargil 
Crisis placed blame on the intelligence community’s collection capabilities.  The 
committee noted that if India had a half-meter resolution satellite imagery capability, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and better HUMINT, then Kargil might have been 
prevented.43  The recommendations placed emphasis to enhance intelligence capabilities 
through technical means.44  
 
E. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE 
Armed forces and military planners have sought accurate and timely information 
throughout history.  Genghis Khan used to employ horse cavalry in outflanking forays 
against enemy dispositions to gather vital information before the main offensive.  Today, 
there are technological means to gather information against the enemy.  ISR technologies, 
satellites, and radars provide military leaders with highly accurate intelligence and 
enhance the situational awareness by several orders of magnitude. 45  Technologies in 
obtaining intelligence, carrying out surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking friendly 
forces have resulted in the current battlespace encompassing advanced surveillance and 
target acquisition technologies like battlefield surveillance radars, mortar locating radars 
and various other kinds of surveillance radars and sensors.  These advances in ISR 
technologies are making the battlespace more transparent. 46
In most of the conflicts India has been involved in since its independence, Indian 
military forces have been subjected to surprise.  The 1947 incursion in J&K, the 1962 
attack by China, the 1965 infiltration in the Kashmir Valley by Pakistani forces, and the 
1999 Kargil incident were all a result of the failure by Indian military to conduct effective 
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surveillance and reconnaissance.47  In order for India to avoid surprises by its adversaries 
in the future, Indians believe they need to develop, maintain and continuously fine-tune 
their surveillance and reconnaissance assets, both air and space based.48    
The Indian Army continues to be involved in near-warlike situation along the line 
of control (LoC) in Kashmir and along the Sino-Indian borders.  From the Indian Army’s 
perspective the Indian Air Force needs to provide greater all-weather surveillance and 
operational intelligence.  Indians foresee the shift in the Chinese armed forces doctrine 
towards preemptive surprise attacks in a local border war as a potential threat to Indian 
security and want to establish a reliable ISR system.49  Indians cite the example of the 
1982 Bekaa Valley operations to show how airborne ISR through the employment of 
AWACS, electronic warfare, unmanned aircraft and sensors can provide an advantage 
over an adversary. 50  The Indian military is on a quest to attain an ISR capability based 
on technologies in radars, electro-optical sensors, electronic intelligence, and imagery.  
These technologies are improving ISR capabilities and will lead to easier detection of 
enemy disposition and hence make them more vulnerable.  Indians believe that having 
AWACS capability is absolutely essential for air defense.  “While the AWACs will 
extend our air defence cover, they will also preclude nasty surprises, enlarge the 
operating envelope of our offensive elements, reduce attrition by timely warning, 
improve our ELINT capability.”51   
Employment of UAVs, aircraft and satellite systems will be needed to attain an 
effective ISR capability.  Indian officials believe that UAVs are a potential economic 
solution for improving their ISR capabilities.52  India is interested in the UAVs for their 
ability to loiter for long periods of time at high altitudes.  India is cognizant of the U.S. 
Global Hawk UAV, which has completed a trans-Atlantic flight and has an endurance of 
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forty-two hours at over 60,000 feet. 53  Indian military wants to pursue UAVs to attain the 
capability to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, and gather intelligence over 
enemy territory without any risk to personnel.     
Indian officials recognized the important contributions of satellites during the 
Gulf War.  They understand that satellites can support and enhance traditional air 
operations.  “The application of GPS to aircraft navigation and weapon guidance could 
confer all weather capabilities on PGMs…Satellite surveillance by optical, infra-red and 
radar technology will continue to provide strategic intelligence.”54  Indian military is 
making efforts to obtain dedicated military satellites for ISR, target acquisition systems, 
and airborne early warning platforms for early detection of missile launch site 
preparations, for ground, air, and maritime forces deployments, and for indications and 
warnings (I&W).55  India’s limitations in ISR during the Kargil Crisis are being 
addressed by the Indians.     
Another lesson learned by the Indian military from the Gulf War was recognizing 
the role ISR can play in battle damage assessment (BDA).  Having an accurate 
assessment of the BDA supports the forces in the battlefield by providing them with 
information on targets and helps determine possible courses of action.   
After observing the success of the United States in the Gulf War, Indians foresee 
a greater role for ISR and precision strike capabilities in the future air force.  “The 
stunning victory of the western armed forces and their allies in the Gulf War of 1991 
could doubtless be ascribed to the efficacy, reach and lethality of air power which has 
taken a quantum jump through employment of significant force multipliers like Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS), Joint Tactical Information Distribution system (JTIDS), in-flight refueling, 
satellite aided navigation, precision-force technologies etc.”56  Indians believe the shift of 
ISR capabilities from land based platforms to air and space based platforms is 
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revolutionizing the intelligence gathering techniques and the Indian military has to obtain 
these capabilities. 
 
F. PRECISION STRIKE 
The quest for improved accuracy and longer range weapons has been present 
among the armed forces throughout history.  Rifling in the 19th century extended the 
range and accuracy of guns, and the introduction of tanks and aircraft stretched the length 
of the battlefields.57  Indians believe there is a discernible trend towards an enhanced role 
for combat power with long range strike proficiencies and all-weather day and night 
capabilities to strike targets selectively and with discrimination.58  India foresees a 
greater role for air power and precision firepower in the future.  During the Gulf War, the 
U.S.-led coalition forces ensured air superiority to achieve an advantage for the 
remainder of air, maritime and land operations.59  Targeting of key military and 
command and control (C2) centers through the employment of precision strikes during 
the Gulf War provided the Indians with an example of the importance of strategic air 
offensive with focused precision strikes, and a model to emulate.  
Indians believe that the quality of an armed force is more important than the 
number of weapons it carries.  “[P]latforms like aircraft, ships, tanks and guns etc will be 
less reflective of military power than the quality of what it carries by way of sensors, 
munitions, avionic suites, communications etc. The first long-range precision strike may 
prove decisive as happened to the Iraqi air defence system during the Gulf War.”60  The 
Indians have also learned the importance of precision strike capability from observing the 
U.S. military’s use of long-range precision firepower, like the Tomahawk cruise missile, 
against Usama bin-Ladin’s camps in Afghanistan.  Technological trends such as long 
range precision strikes and force multipliers are becoming increasingly dominant for 
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conduct of warfare in the foreseeable future and are impacting the battlespace.61  Having 
precision strike capability will provide the Indian military with the ability to conduct 
focused strikes with a parsimonious employment of weapons.  There is a heightened 
interest in India in obtaining “robot-planes” to strike deep into enemy territory.  This 
would provide India with the capability to conduct precision strikes against an advisory 
without any risk to their own personnel.  Indians believe that future crises will demand 
surgical strikes against certain target systems to forestall a war.  To accomplish this in an 
efficient, effective, and parsimonious manner, precision guided munitions and platforms 
are necessary.  Obtaining and maintaining a long-range precision strike capability is also 
critical for India since it is the only reliable platform for India’s minimum credible 
nuclear deterrent.62
The advantages of precision strikes are apparent when comparisons are made 
between air strike operations from World War II (WWII), the Vietnam War and the Gulf 
War.  To achieve an equivalent target destruction of 4,500 B-17 sorties during WWII, 95 
F-105 sorties were needed during the Vietnam War, and only one F-117 sortie was 
required during the Gulf War.  Four advanced fighter aircraft can achieve the same 
damage today as 568 strategic bombing missions by the Allies in WWII achieved over 
one year.  A U.S. DOD summary compared the accuracy probability figures of the B17 to 
be 3,300 ft, the F-105 to be 400 ft, the F16 to be 200 ft, and the F 117 to be less than 10 
ft.63  This reduction of aircraft requirements and increased effectiveness result in greater 
savings for the military and higher operational efficiency.  “In a hot war, air interdiction 
against strategic targets such as power grids, communication networks and their key 
nodal points would require multi node aircraft with PGMs, or ALCMs for long-range 
precision strikes.  India’s air power cannot afford not to have such a capability.”64
The Indian military wants to attain a military capable of joint operations.  To this 
end, they want the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force to be able to conduct cohesive 
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operations.  For the future, the Indians foresee the use of air power in coordination with 
friendly surface force and tactical reconnaissance as part of the missions for the Air 
Force.65  They view the ground and air forces working in conjunction with each other in 
the future conventional battlefield.  This will increase the necessity for the air force to be 
able to provide close air support (CAS) to the ground forces, and also conduct 
surveillance and reconnaissance to attain intelligence on enemy disposition.  These will 
be critical roles for the air force on which the Indians believe the success of future 
military operations will depend.   
The Indian military also foresees a counter-intelligence (CI) role for the IAF.  
From the Indian perspective, the infiltration into Kashmir by “terrorists” is of grave 
concern and the IAF can play a role in countering the problem.  The IAF can be used to 
“hound and pound the terrorists and the insurgents in their hideouts.  Further, and more 
importantly, should the situation so demand, the Army would want the Air Force to stand 
ready to hit at the terrorist bases and launch-pads across the LoC.”66  This role for the 
IAF can be best addressed by incorporating the application of precision guided munitions 
(PGMs).   
India’s use of laser guided bombs against the Pakistani forces during the Kargil 
Crisis, and the success of the precision technologies has reinforced to the Indians the 
need for greater incorporation of precision firepower into their military for the future.  
“The future sub-continental battlespace will be dominated by a wide variety of platforms 
and delivery means …with increased ranges and accuracy, terminally guided munitions, 
precision guided munitions and improved tanks and aircrafts with precision 
capabilities.”67   The induction of state-of-the-art anti-tank guided missiles, laser-aimed 
weapons, laser target designators and the development of smart munitions by the Indians 
confirms the trend towards precision fire. 
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The nature of war demands a quick induction of massive firepower.   Long range 
precision munitions can be used to “soften” the target without any risk to friendly forces.  
It can be used to attack the enemy’s high value assets, like the command and control and 
platforms and missile sites, and also provide close air support to the ground forces and 
help minimize the threat to friendly troops on the ground.   
 
G. MISSILE DEFENSE 
Indian interest has revolved around missile defense related developments for 
several years.  Missile defense became an issue for Asian countries after China launched 
missiles in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996, and after North Korea launched a 
Taepodong missile in 1998.  Although these events did not affect India directly, they 
made India more aware of the threat.  The use of Tomahawk missiles in Afghanistan and 
Kosovo by the U.S. increased India’s general sense of unease.  These concerns became 
more serious for India following reports about the transfer of Chinese M-11 missiles to 
Pakistan and the deployment of Chinese nuclear missiles in Tibet.68
India views itself as having been under a nuclear threat for decades.  Initially the 
threat was only from China and then from China’s proliferation of nuclear weapons 
capability to Pakistan.69  According to India, Pakistan’s drive to obtain nuclear weapons 
has been most importantly to counter India’s superior conventional capabilities that 
became apparent following the 1971 war.  On October 5, 1999, Pakistan’s Foreign 
Minister Abdul Sattar disclosed, in News International, that Pakistan conceived its 
nuclear weapons program in the wake of its defeat in 1971 war and it was India-
specific.70  Indians cite the 1998 nuclear tests by Pakistan following the tests by India as 
an example of Pakistan’s nuclear program being India-specific.  Indians believe that 
Pakistan will continue to obtain required material for its nuclear and missile 
manufacturing facilities without hindrance and has the capability and intentions to 
employ nuclear weapons against the Indians if needed.  And ignoring this threat will 
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jeopardize India’s security, safety and interests.71  Indians believe that it is a moral 
imperative to pursue missile defense capability since it attempts to save human lives.72
Pakistan also upholds the policy of first use of nuclear weapons, which 
necessitates its arsenal to remain in a state of readiness.  This has forced India to acquire 
or build the attendant paraphernalia such as early warning capabilities and to build 
security measures for its own safety.73  This denial by Pakistan to adhere to the no first 
use policy and minimum credible nuclear deterrence is perceived by Indians as a negative 
attitude towards an important nuclear confidence-building measure and exposes a 
mindset that considers nuclear weapons as weapons of war.74  And India’s own no-first-
use (NFU) policy, combined with Pakistan’s refusal to employ the same policy, has 
driven India to pursue missile defense capability.  Indians perceive this as hostile intent 
and believe they have a need to protect themselves against this possible aggressive threat 
from Pakistan.75
India’s primary defense against an attack is its pursuit of superior military 
capability, but Indians want to pursue missile defense capability to provide security in 
case its deterrence fails.  Having a missile defense capability can limit damage if an 
adversary can not be deterred and engages in a suicidal attack.76  There is also the 
possibility of an inadvertent or accidental use of nuclear weapons.  An unintended use 
could occur either because of improper judgment by the political leadership (such as 
through an unintended or inadvertent escalation), or use without the concurrence of the 
political leadership (such as unauthorized use by military commanders), or because of 
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inadequate safety measures leading to an accident.77  India is especially concerned about 
an unauthorized use of nuclear weapons by a military commander in Pakistan, given that 
nuclear weapons are under the control of the military and not civilian authorities in 
Pakistan. The Indian leadership believes there is also the possibility of an unintended use 
of nuclear weapons and India must take defensive measures against such possibilities.   
Pakistan has developed a significant and reliable “diad” delivery system for its 
nuclear arsenal.  It has both aircraft capable delivery systems and land-based missiles.  
Pakistan has both liquid fuelled missiles and solid fuelled missiles, and these missiles 
have been tested and proven reliable.  Pakistan’s liquid fuelled Ghauri II ballistic 
missiles, with a range of 2,000km, are capable of delivering nuclear warheads on key 
Indian cities from deep inside Pakistani territory.  Pakistan’s capability to deliver nuclear 
weapons to key Indian cities is another reason why Indians feel a need for missile 
defense.  Even though a missile defense system will not be able to protect all Indian 
cities, nor will it be able to provide 100 percent protection against a missile attack, the 
Indian officials believe that they must make efforts to provide the highest level of 
protection to the population.     
The Chinese consider their nuclear forces an “important pillar” of their status and 
stability.78  Indians feel that the decision by the U.S. to pursue ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) is likely to compel China to adopt counter-BMD measures by embarking on a 
qualitative and quantitative nuclear arsenal.  This will likely entail an expanded arsenal, 
multiple-warhead missiles and the adoption of an alert posture.  The critics of the U.S. 
policy to pursue national missile defense, including former Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright, echo this view.  “Indians also fear that a China antagonized by American 
missile defense may draw even closer to Pakistan and accelerate strategic cooperation 
with it.” 79  The Director General of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Department of Arms 
Control and Disarmament, Ambassador Sha Zukang, has said that "China will do 
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everything possible to ensure its security, and the measures it will take will be in 
proportion to the success of [national missile defence]."80
Indians foresee an increasing missile threat to their security vis-à-vis China.  The 
Chinese are developing their cruise missile capabilities. The HN-1A is the ground-
launched version of the HN-1B, which is an air launched cruise missile with a range of 
600Km. These are reportedly capable of carrying a 90 kT nuclear or a 400-kg 
conventional warhead.  HN-2 and HN-3 with 1400 and 1800 Km ranges are reportedly 
under development. 81  Indians believe that Chinese collaboration with Russia has 
significantly improved Chinese missiles, and Pakistan will benefit from this improved 
capability as well. 82  This makes procuring a functional missile defense system critical to 
India for its security.   
Indians believe that the Chinese possess a significant number of tactical nuclear 
weapons used for nuclear war-fighting, indicating a shift in Chinese nuclear doctrine and 
strategy.83 The implications for peace and security in Asia to the Indians may be gauged 
from the fact that over 98 per cent of China’s nuclear weapons have relevance only for 
the countries on its periphery in Asia.84  Given the Indian perception that most of China’s 
nuclear arsenal is in fact specific to countries like India, the Indians believe it is in their 
self-interest to be able to counter this threat.   
China also maintains its nuclear arsenal in a deployed status and its delivery 
capabilities are assessed to be reliable and better than those of India.  China also 
maintains only a conditional no first use policy.  “China has taken pains to point out that 
its no first use would not apply to territories it claims as its own…”85  This is a definite 
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cause for concern for India given that the two countries have unresolved territorial claims 
in the Indian northeastern states and the upper Himalayan reaches. 
Unlike against Pakistan, India does not currently possess a deliverable nuclear 
deterrent against the Chinese, which makes pursuing a missile defense system even more 
critical from security perspective.  “[N]one of these systems can provide an effective 
deterrent against the Chinese until a longer range Agni (at least Agni III with a range of 
3,500 km) is operationalised.”86
Another reason behind India’s motivation for missile defense has been political.  
The Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) backed Indian government was one of the first to back at 
least parts of President Bush’s national missile defense initiative unveiled in May 2001.  
BJP wanted to use this as a tool for building cooperation between India and the United 
States.  India’s inability to test nuclear weapons before January 1st, 1968 made it 
impossible for India to be accepted as a legitimate nuclear weapons power, and Indian 
officials hoped to open the door to addressing India’s issues with the global nuclear order 
and India’s place in it by backing the United States initiative.  This initiative by the Bush 
administration to rework the global nuclear order was seen by the BJP leaders as 
providing an opportunity for India to become part of the making of a new system of 
nuclear rules.87    
Another political perspective for pursuing missile defense capability has been 
domestic politics.  Indian leaders, like in any other democratic country, have to appease 
their constituents in order to get reelected.  And the Indian populace wants to know that 
their government is doing whatever it can to protect the people from a potential missile 
threat.88  Therefore, in order to provide the people a sense of security, the Indian 
government has chosen to pursue missile defense technologies. 
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Indians foresee the future leadership of Asia to be decided between China and 
India.  This may not happen in the near future but it is perceived as an eventuality.  In the 
meantime, Indians believe it is in their own interest to pursue missile defense technology. 
 
H. CONCLUSION 
Indian military efforts in recent years to modernize its ISR, precision strike, and 
missile defense capabilities are largely driven by their perception of threat from China 
and Pakistan.  Their own experiences during past conflicts, like the Kargil Crisis, have 
contributed to the Indian military’s desires to modernize its military capabilities.  Indians 
believe that attaining long range precision strike technologies will increase India’s 
deterrent capability, and obtaining UAVs and satellites will reinforce current ISR 
capabilities.89 Obtaining an improved ISR capability for an enhanced situational 
awareness and accurate intelligence combined with long range precision weapons can 
inflict unprecedented levels of destruction on an adversary.  Having these capabilities can 
provide a significant advantage over the enemy in an engagement.  An accurate and 
enhanced ISR capability can also prevent a conflict from escalating by providing 
information to better prepare defensive forces.  Long range precision weapons can act as 
a deterrent to a potential attacker who may be concerned about suffering significant loses.  
If, however, the deterrent fails, Indians believe it is in their security interest to pursue 
























































III. INDIA’S ISR, PRECISION STRIKE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE 
MODERNIZATION EFFORTS 
India has made a concerted effort since the late-1990s to modernize its ISR, 
precision strike, and missile defense capabilities to counter the perceived threats from 
China and Pakistan.  The Indian military is making significant progress in acquiring and 
developing sophisticated platforms.  In order to improve its ISR, which was a lesson 
learned during the Kargil Crisis, the Indian military has procured the Phalcon AWACS 
(Airborne Warning and Control System) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) along 
with other platforms.  To improve its offensive capability and accuracy for deterrence, 
India is focusing on improving its precision strike capabilities through the acquisition of, 
among other things, the Sukhoi Su-30MKI (Russian acronym for Multirole, Commercial, 
Indian) advanced combat fighter and the Rafael Litening targeting pod.   To defend 
against inbound missiles, India is attempting to procure a missile defense system with the 
purchase of systems like the Israeli Barak anti-missile missile system and the Russian S-
300PMU air defense system.  This chapter focuses on the efforts being undertaken by the 
Indian military to modernize its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense, and the 
capabilities they provide the Indian military.  It is important to evaluate the efforts 
undertaken by India and their affects to understand what possible consequences they may 
have on the stability of the region (as will be discussed in the next chapter).   
India is indigenously developing and acquiring foreign weapons systems to deter 
aggressive actions from both China and Pakistan.  It also wants to be able to protect itself 
against a missile attack and maintain an offensive strike capability for possible punitive 
actions in case of another Kargil-like scenario.  To accomplish these goals, India is 
concentrating on acquiring some key weapons systems to improve its ISR, precision 
strike, and missile defense capabilities.  To improve its ISR capabilities, India is focusing 
its acquisition and development efforts on the Phalcon AWACS, Surveillance radars 
(PIN521 and the battlefield surveillance system), AN-TPQ/37 weapon locating radar, 
UAVs, satellites, and maritime surveillance aircraft (TU-142, IL-38, TU-22, P-3s).  The 
Sukhoi Su-30MKI advanced combat fighter, Mirage 2000-5, upgrade of the Jaguar and 
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the MiG-27, KONKURS-M and Nag anti-tank guided weapon system, Krasnopol 
152/155mm guided artillery weapon, Vikhr multi-purpose guided weapon, Rafael 
litening targeting pod are all platforms that are expected to provide India with an 
improved precision strike capabilities.  And in order to obtain a missile defense 
capability, India is on a quest to procure the Barak anti-missile missile system, the 
Greenpine radar system, the Arrow anti-missile system, the Antey 2500 anti-ballistic 
missile (ABM) launchers, and the S-300PMU air defense system.90
This chapter presents the weapons systems India is procuring and the role they 
will play in improving the Indian military’s ISR, precision strike, and missile defense 
capabilities.  Understanding the effects of these weapons systems on the Indian military’s 
capabilities is vital in evaluating how Pakistan might react to these efforts by India, 
which is critical in understanding how the stability in South Asia may be affected by 
India’s modernization efforts.  First, what efforts India has undertaken to improve its ISR 
and how they will affect India’s ISR capabilities is presented.  This is followed by 




The drive behind India’s desire for an improved ISR capability has been the 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance failures of the Indian military in the past.  
There are several examples of this, including the 1947 incursion in J&K where Pakistani 
“forces” were able to avoid surveillance and infiltrate without being detected.  The 1962 
attack by China was a complete surprise to the Indians and an intelligence failure.  The 
1965 infiltration in the Kashmir Valley by Pakistani forces and the 1999 Kargil incident 
are both examples of surveillance and reconnaissance failures on the part of the Indians 
which allowed Pakistani forces to infiltrate into Indian territory undetected.91  A lack of a 
functional ISR has subjected the Indian military to surprise attacks in the past, and there 
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has been a concerted effort to avoid the same mistakes in the future by improving its ISR 
capabilities.  The thrust of India’s efforts for improving its ISR capabilities is a mix of 
indigenous development and foreign acquisition.  India has launched technological 
empowerment programs for the development of technologies and systems, and has 
simultaneously initiated an aggressive foreign technology procurement program.  This 
has resulted in India obtaining the Phalcon AWACS, several surveillance and weapon 
locating radars, maritime surveillance aircraft, UAVs, and satellites. 
1. Phalcon AWACS 
The Phalcon AWACS encompasses the thrust of India’s ISR improvement efforts.  
The Israeli government approved a US $1.1 billion deal in October 2003 to export its 
Phalcon airborne early warning system to India.  According to the deal, Israel will 
purchase three IL-76 transports from Ukraine, and following avionics and more powerful 
engines upgrades in Russia, Israel will integrate the Phalcon radar suite in the aircraft.  
The first complete system is expected to be in service by the end of 2006, with the 
completion of the contract by 2009/2010.92  The Phalcon has the capability to conduct 
both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) 
electronic support measures.93  The Phalcon airborne early warning system will be able 
to monitor air space activity out to the range of 500 km, and will be able to track up to 
100 targets, provide real time data to Indian combat fighters, and transmit information 
directly to ground stations.94  India foresees the Phalcon airborne early warning system as 
an ISR platform that will maximize India’s air defense capability by improving its ability 
to coordinate air strikes through an increased capability to detect aerial threats, and by 
directing Indian combat aircraft to potential targets.   
The addition of the Phalcon AWACS will provide the Indian military with the 
ability to track Pakistani aircraft that enter Indian airspace and guide IAF fighters to 
intercept them.  This is a significant advantage for the Indians since it can potentially 
neutralize Pakistan’s capability to deliver weapons on Indian targets via aircraft.  The 
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Phalcon AWACS will also provide the Indian military with the capability to conduct ISR 
operations well inside Pakistan’s territory and conduct air operations against Pakistan by 
providing fighter aircraft with real time targeting data on Pakistani targets.   
 Another reason for the Indian military to acquire the Phalcon AWACS was to fill 
the ISR gap in the Himalayas.   The Phalcon system is capable of detecting enemy 
aircraft in all weather, day or night, and even at low altitude.95  The advanced warning 
Phalcon will be of great tactical significance in a confrontation with China.  Having the 
ability to detect a Chinese attack early will provide India with the intelligence that could 
potentially be the difference between successfully encountering the threat and losing a 
battle.  The Phalcon AWACS gives India the early warning it needs to properly defend 
itself against potential surprises along the Himalayas.96
2. Other ISR Efforts 
a. Radars 
PIN 521 surveillance radar is an active and passive radar for navigation 
and attack.  It is designed to detect surface targets and autonomously furnish the target 
data directly to the weapon control system for missile firing at the targets.97
The battlefield surveillance system (BSS), currently under development, is 
a state-of-the-art surveillance system that can be used for ground surveillance of a large 
area of the order of 300x300 km.  The BSS will provide surveillance of the entire 
battlefield in all weather conditions, and automatically transmit information via radio 
links.98
b. AN-TPQ/37 Weapon Locating Radar 
The Indian Army took delivery from the United States of two “Firefinder” 
counter-battery radar systems on 10 July 2003.  Under the Indo-U.S. military sales 
agreement the United States will provide 12 AN-TPQ/37 radar systems to India, 
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scheduled to commence in September 2004 and be completed over two years.99  The 
radar system uses a combination of radar techniques and computer functions to detect and 
accurately locate the point of origin of an artillery, mortar, rocket launchers and missiles 
to permit tracking and rapid engagement with counter-fire.100
India’s efforts to procure these radars have been an attempt to obtain the 
capability to achieve a complete ISR coverage of potential future battlefields.  The 
surveillance radars the Indian military is procuring are fully integrated systems that are 
capable of detecting and tracking targets, and also furnish the information to the weapons 
systems for firing solutions.  This will provide India with a significant improvement over 
its current ISR capability by not just detecting targets but also by responding to them in 
an effective and lethal manner.  This is a significant step for India towards improving its 
tactical ISR capability through which India hopes to avoid future surveillance and 
reconnaissance failures.  
c. Maritime Surveillance Aircraft (TU-142, IL-38, TU-22, P-3s) 
Improving its ISR is part of the Indian Navy’s wish list as well.  The 
Indian Navy is looking to procure maritime reconnaissance aircraft and is also 
modernizing its fleet of IL-38 reconnaissance aircraft.  Negotiations have been taking 
place with the United States to buy eight used P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft, under the 
U.S. foreign military sales program; and reportedly the U.S. government recently 
approved the sale of the aircraft to India by Lockheed Martin.  The exact details of the 
sale are still to be negotiated.101  Acquiring the P-3s is important for the Indian Navy 
since Russia has held back the Indian Navy’s lease of four Tu-22 Backfire bombers that 
were expected to fill the reconnaissance role.  Eight of Indian Navy’s Tu-142 maritime 
aircraft and the three remaining IL-38’s are poised for upgrade in Russia.  The Indian 
Navy continues to strive for an improved ISR capability to supplement India’s overall 
military ISR capability. 
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3. UAVs and Satellites 
The final component in the quest for achieving a competent and significant ISR 
capability is procuring and developing UAVs and satellites.  India is involved in purchase 
negotiations with Russia, Germany, Austria, United States, Switzerland, Israel and South 
Africa for UAVs.  High altitude UAVs are required in Jammu and Kashmir since they are 
the best platform to conduct ISR operations in the mountainous terrain of the Himalayas 
where surface radars are of little use.  India has already acquired Israeli-built Searcher-II 
and Heron UAVs.  The Indian Army has ordered 18 Heron UAVs, scheduled to be 
delivered this year, and the IAF was expected to order 16 more.  The Indian Navy also 
has ordered four Heron and eight Searcher UAVs.  The Heron is an operational fourth-
generation, medium-altitude long endurance, no visibility, no sound signature system 
with endurance of up to 36 hours of continuous flight that provides deep penetration, 
wide area, real time ISR to national agencies and theater commanders for intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield, target acquisition and directing fire on targets.  The 
Searcher-II is an all-weather, high-altitude UAV with a height ceiling of nearly 30,000 
feet.  India is also attempting to acquire low-altitude, short-range UAVs for tactical use to 
obtain timely ISR for the commanders in the battlefield.  The UAVs will provide an 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role, improve India’s target acquisition 
capability and help direct accurate fire on enemy targets in the battlefield.102
Over the last three decades, India has achieved notable progress in the design, 
development and operation of space systems, and India’s surveillance capabilities have 
been significantly enhanced with the launch of the IRS-TES (Indian Remote Sensing–
Technology Experiment Satellite) satellite.  The TES carries a panchromatic camera with 
a spatial resolution of one meter and provides the Indian space program with a potential 
to place several highly effective ISR platforms in space in the near future.103  The launch 
of the TES in October 2001 signified a new dimension in India’s ISR capability.  Having 
a space based ISR platform makes the targets in Pakistan more vulnerable to targeting by 
India and also provides the Indian military an effective indications and warning (I&W) 
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platform.  This is a significant advantage for India over its adversary since an improved 
I&W capability provides India with an opportunity to effectively respond prior to a 
potential strike by Pakistan or China, thereby avoiding potentially devastating loses.  
Satellites can also provide India with target acquisition of targets deep in Pakistan’s 
territory, which were previously not within India’s capability to acquire. 
India also is seeking to obtain access to Israel’s super-high resolution imagery 
from its Ofeq-5 spy satellite.  The actual performance specifications of the satellite are 
classified, but it is assumed to be capable of capturing details much less than half-meter 
across.  India is also pursuing joint satellite ventures with Israel that will help thrust 
India’s space based ISR program.  The IAF is striving to be able to launch a dedicated 
satellite for the armed forces in the near future to cater to reconnaissance and real-time 
intelligence needs.  For its long-term goal, the IAF has started to work on conceptualizing 
weapon systems for space, with an eventual goal of UAVs and satellite technology-based 
laser weapon systems.104
A remotely piloted vehicle, Nishant, has been developed by the Defense Research 
and Development Organization (DRDO) for the Indian Army (IA).105  The Nishant will 
be able to provide battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance for target acquisition and 
target tracking, real time engagement of targets by artillery fire, and damage assessment.  
More than 84 development flights have been carried out and the IA has decided to go in 
for induction of Nishant through limited series production.106  
The pursuit of improved ISR capability by the Indian military has been motivated 
largely by its repeated I&W failures during past wars to pick up threats in a timely 
manner and prevent surprise attacks by its adversaries.  Driven by the desire to prevent 
future surprises, India is well on its way to achieving the goal of increasing its ISR 
capabilities.  A spectrum of radars, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, UAVs and 
satellites is significantly improving India’s technological capabilities to conduct ISR.      
 
 
104Singh, 334, 336. 
105 Army buying 12 Nishant UAVs for surveillance: DRDO, accessed from the internet on 01 March 
2005, at website       http://news.indiainfo.com/2005/02/11/1102nishant.html.  
106 Singh, 538. 
 40
                                                
B. PRECISION STRIKE 
This section will present the precision strike platforms India has procured and 
developed, and the capabilities these platforms provide the Indian military in its quest to 
upgrade its precision strike capabilities.  The Indian military wants to attain a precision 
strike capability based on high-technology as part of its strategic deterrence capability.  
The 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo air campaign highlighted the role of technology 
in air power.107  Indian military wants to possess a credible counter-offensive capability 
based on precision strike, which is designed to act in tandem with India’s developing ISR 
capability.  The sophisticated ISR platforms are designed to provide real time information 
on the adversary, and the precision strike capability will deliver a response inflicting 
severe damage to the enemy through accurate delivery of weapons on target.  This 
capability to deliver a severe and accurate response is expected to deter future wars by 
ensuring harsh repercussions on the attacker.  Having the capability for accurate surgical 
strikes against particular targets will be key for the Indian military to forestall future 
crises from developing into wars, and precision guided munitions and platforms are 
paramount to accomplish that mission.  A lack of precision strike capabilities was 
exposed during Operation Parakram in 2002.108  This was evident in the fact that India’s 
military doctrine was defense-oriented and lacked an offensive attack capability, which 
were largely assigned to only three strike formations.109  In order to upgrade its precision 
strike capabilities, India is procuring the Sukhoi Su-30MKI advanced combat fighter, 
Mirage 2000-5, and upgrading the Jaguar and the MiG-27; inducting the KONKURS-M 
and Nag anti-tank guided weapon systems and the Krasnopol 152/155mm guided artillery 
weapon into the Indian Army; and utilizing the Rafael litening targeting pod in the IAF.  
The following sections present these platforms and their capabilities, and their affects on 
India’s precision strike capability. 
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1. Aircraft 
Aircraft are a critical part of the precision strike capability since they provide the 
means to deliver the PGMs on target and also help by providing laser designation on 
targets.  The IAF signed a U.S. $1.8 billion contract with Russia in 1996 for the Su-
30MKI to fill the need for a multi-role fighter with superlative air superiority and ground 
attack capabilities.110  The Su-30 is expected to compete with and defeat both the 
Pakistani Air Force’s F-16 and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s J-11, and also 
deliver precision guided munitions (PGMs) from the air well within the boundaries of 
both Pakistan and China.  Currently, the IAF operates 18 Su-30K and 22 Su-30MKI 
fighters and has obtained the rights to produce the Su-30MKI indigenously, with 140 Su-
30MKIs expected to be produced by 2017.111  From precision strike perspective, the 
aircraft is capable of carrying a vast range of weapon systems including PGMs.  All 
compatible Russian Air-to-Air Missiles and Air-to-Ground Missiles for the Su-30MKI 
are available to the IAF.  The aircraft is capable of carrying up to 6 KAB-500KR and 
KAB-500OD and up to three KAB-1500KR and KAB-1500L guided/smart bombs.112  
The Su-30MKI, with its advanced avionics, precision-guided munitions, and data links 
capable of uploading valuable targeting data, will provide the IAF with the ability to 
conduct precise, punitive strikes on enemy targets within Pakistan with little collateral 
damage.  The Su-30MKI will provide the IAF with an opportunity to be able to attain a 
multi-role fighter capable of engaging the most advanced combat aircraft and engage in 
ground operations through the application of PGMs.   
 Mirage-2000 is the other aircraft India is in the process of acquiring to fulfill the 
duties of delivering PGMs on target.  The Indian military is attempting to acquire 12 
Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft from Qatar at a price of US$37 million per plane.  The 
aircraft, expected to augment India’s nuclear weapon delivery system, possesses 
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precision strike capability and will further enhance the Indian military’s efficiency in 
delivering munitions on targets.  India also is considering a proposal by Dassault for 
licensed production of 100 Mirage 2000-5s in India.113  
India is also upgrading its fleet of Jaguar and MiG-27 aircraft to deliver PGMs.  
The upgrade program is in its first phase where 80 of the aircraft are being upgraded at 
HAL facilities.  The goal of these upgrades is to reach a ratio of 50:50 of ‘high-tech’ to 
‘medium to low-tech’ aircraft in the IAF.  The upgrades include advanced radar, 
navigation, weapon and electronic systems, and precision-guided munitions.  Forty of the 
approximately 100 Jaguars and 40 of the around 150 MiG-27s in the IAF’s inventory are 
being upgraded.  In all, around 140 MiG-27s will be upgraded by February 2008.  The 
first of the upgraded MiG-27s is expected to obtain final operational clearance by 
October 2005.114
2. KONKURS-M, Nag, and the Krasnopol 152/155mm 
KONKURS-M is an anti-tank guided weapon system.  It is a mobile, high-
precision, long-range weapon system with semi-active guidance.115  It is a tactical system 
that provides troops on land with an enhanced capability to target enemy tanks with 
precision weapons. 
Nag is a third-generation all weather guided anti-tank missile with fire-and-forget 
capability and a range of 4,000 meters.  It is capable of defeating any known tank with 
either composite or reactive armors.116  The last guided flight trial with day and night 
seeker was conducted on 17 September 2002.  The imaging infra-red (IIR) sensor based 
seeker guidance version of the Nag has given India a hundred percent hit ability, making 
India only the sixth country in the world to have such technology.117   
Krasnopol 152/155mm guided artillery weapon is designed to destroy stationary 
and moving armored and soft targets by the first shot without fire adjustment.  The 
system is capable of firing from multiple weapons against a hard target.  The initial part 
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of the trajectory is normal ballistic trajectory, however, a seeker in the nose of the 
projectile locks on to a laser illumination from a forward observer designating the target 
using a laser target designator.  The designation range for tanks is 7,000 meters for 
stationary targets and 5,000 meters for moving targets.118    
These tactical systems are further examples of the wide range of precision strike 
weapon systems India is procuring in an effort to improve its precision strike capability to 
maximize its military’s economy of effort.  These weapons are expected to significantly 
improve the quality of India’s military and improve the effectiveness and lethality of its 
military power. 
3. Rafael Litening Targeting Pod 
The Rafael Litening targeting pod has been a critical piece in India’s quest for a 
capable precision strike capability.  The Litening targeting pod was selected by the IAF 
in 1996 for the Mirage 2000s and the Jaguars.119 It incorporates in a single pod several 
targeting features required by a modern strike fighter for precision strike.  It includes a 
FLIR target marker, a TV camera, a flash-lamp powered laser designator, laser spot 
detection for tracking target designated by other aircraft or from ground, and an electro-
optical point and inertial tracker, which enables continuous engagement of the target even 
when the target is partly obscured by clouds or countermeasures.120
The Litening targeting pod is another tactical platform that is part of India’s 
continuing effort to improve its precision strike capabilities.  One of the lessons the 
Indians learned from the first Gulf War was that the quality of an armed force is more 
important than the number of weapons it possesses.  Possessing precision strike 
capability provides a military the ability to effective target and destroy enemy assets, and 
deliver a potential lethal blow to the enemy’s forces in an efficient manner.  India 
foresees using its precision strike capability to counter the infiltration into Kashmir by 
using PGMs to launch strikes against terrorist camps.  India also wants to use the 
technological advantage and superiority over Pakistan as a deterrence by ensuring a 
 
118 Jane’s Ammunition Handbook, 10 September 2004, http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp. 
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120 Jane's Electro-Optic Systems, 6 August 2004, http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp. 
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successful and severely damaging counter-strike.  The Indians use and success of laser 
guided bombs during the Kargil crisis has been another reason for India’s continuing 
pursuit of precision strike capabilities.  India plans to use its precision strike munitions to 
‘soften’ the enemy by targeting its high-value assets while minimizing risk to friendly 
forces.   
 
C. MISSILE DEFENSE 
Missile defense is an important element of dissuasion in India’s policy to dissuade 
and deter. A combination of Pakistani missile tests and construction of large numbers of 
tactical ballistic missiles by China have apparently provided the impetus to pursue missile 
defense technologies.121  India’s goal is to fend off possible missile launches into Indian 
territory by Pakistan or China through an effective missile defense capability.  India also 
observed the performance of the Patriot missile defense system, which during the Gulf 
War intercepted eight to nine of the 12 Al-Samoud 2 and Ababil-100 missiles fired at 
Kuwait.  The Patriot missile defense system had only 2-3 minutes to react to some of the 
missiles fired from near the border.122  This is further encouragement to India to pursue a 
missile defense capability that is geared against Pakistan and China, who can reach 
targets in India in a short amount of time with nuclear missiles.  In an effort to attain a 
missile defense capability, India has pursued the procurement or development of the 
Barak anti-missile missile system, Greenpine radar system, Arrow anti-missile system, 
Antey-2500 Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) launchers, S-300PMU air defense 
system.  These systems, their capabilities, and their contribution to India’s goal for a 
missile defense will be discussed below. 
1. Barak Anti-Missile Missile System 
As part of its missile defense system India ordered the Barak anti-missile missile 
system from Israel in November 2000.  It is a tactical weapon system designed to 
intercept sea-skimming missiles, cruise missiles, or air-launched missiles in all weather 
conditions and during day or night.  It has an intercept range from 500 meters to probably 
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about 5 kilometers against sea-skimming anti-ship missiles and 12 kilometers against 
aircraft targets.  The Barak anti-missile missile system has been installed on the aircraft 
carrier INS Viraat, the Godavari class frigates, and may also be fitted on the modified 
Brahmaputra class frigates.123  The procurement of the Barak is the first stage in India’s 
desire to acquire a comprehensive theater missile defense system capable of intercepting 
a variety of missiles, including the ballistic missiles in the future.124   
2. S-300PMU 
The S-300PMU is a version of the SA-10 surface-to-air missile system.  It is 
capable of engaging multiple targets simultaneously, has a capability against low-altitude 
targets with small radar cross-sections such as cruise missiles, a capability against tactical 
ballistic missiles, and possibly a potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic 
missiles.  The S-300PMU has an engagement altitude from 25 meters to about 30000 
meters, and has an engagement range of at least 90000 meters.  The system employs the 
CLAM SHELL 3D Doppler radar for target acquisition and the FLAP LID phased-array 
radar for engagement.  The BIG BIRD long-range, 3D surveillance and tracking radar is 
used with the S-300PMU at the regimental level for initial target detection.  The FLAP 
LID guidance radar provides the system with the capability to engage up to six targets 
simultaneously, with two missiles assigned per target to ensure a high kill probability.  
The system can reportedly engage a target with velocity up to 4200km/h.  Reportedly in 
June 1996 27 S-300 missiles were delivered to India.125
For the future, India also is interested in licensed production of 25 batteries of S-
300 and wants to acquire six S-300 PMU1 low- to high-altitude air defense systems.126  
The S-300PMU1 is an extended range version of S-300PMU with a limited anti-ballistic 
 
123 Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 21 February 2005, http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp. 
124 Singh, 326. 
125 Federation of American Scientists website, 30 June 2000, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300pmu.htm, (17 February 2005). 
126 Singh, 437. 
 46
                                                
missile capability, including capabilities against aerodynamic targets with speeds up to 
10800km/h.127  No final decision has been reached on these proposals.   
3. Arrow Anti-Missile System and Greenpine Radar System 
India has obtained the Green Pine Radar System and is interested in obtaining the 
Arrow anti-missile system.  India has been in talks with Israel for the possible purchase 
of the Arrow anti-missile system.  The Arrow interceptor was designed as part of Israel’s 
efforts to counter missile threats from Iran, Iraq and Syria.  The system was built in 
conjunction with the United States, and any sale of the system by Israel will require the 
approval of the United States.128  The Arrow-2 weapon system is built around the Green 
Pine Radar System which is capable of tracking up to 14 tactical ballistic missiles from a 
range of over 300km.  And according to Jane’s, the Green Pine Radar has the ability to 
track and illuminate targets traveling at velocities in excess of 7,000mph and to guide the 
Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile missile (ATBMM) to within 4 meters of a specified 
target.   
India acquired a Green Pine Radar system in 2001 for the purpose of developing 
an indigenous anti-missile defense capability, since there is still no certainty of whether 
India will be allowed to purchase the Arrow anti-missile system.  The near-future plans 
are to integrate the 25km range Akash missile and phased array Rajendra radar (when 
they are ready, since currently both are in developmental stages) with the Green Pine.129  
The Akash SAM, with theater missile defense (TDM) potential, is part of the Integrated 
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4. Antey-2500 
In 2001 India became the first customer for the Russian Antey-2500 ATBM 
system.  India will purchase six fire units from Russia and produce additional 19 units 
under license.  The program, including the necessary steps to integrate the Antey-2500 
system into India’s overall air defenses, is expected to cost approximately U.S. $7 billion 
over 15 years.131  India also plans to supplement the Phalcon and Green Pine radar 
systems with approximately 150 Russian Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile launchers at 
some point in the future, as it begins to integrate its missile defense assets.132  
India and Israel also are cooperating in the future development of ballistic missile 
defense systems with boost phase intercept capability and India is seeking Israel’s help in 
developing an anti-missile system based on the Israeli Arrow-2 that would be tailored to 
Indian requirements.133
The radars mentioned above, the Barak, the S-300, and the possible acquisition of 
the Arrow in the future are expected to play a central role in the future comprehensive 
theater missile defense capability for India.  India has been under a nuclear threat from 
China for decades and from Pakistan since 1998, and a future theater missile defense is 
critical to India for its goal to dissuade Pakistan and China from launching a missile 
attack.  And since Pakistan upholds the policy of first use of nuclear weapons, it is 
especially important to India to be able to dissuade Pakistan from launching a missile 
attack against India by obtaining the capability to neutralize a potential missile attack by 
Pakistan. India’s primary defense against an attack is deterrence through its pursuit of 
superior military capability, but India wants to pursue missile defense capability to 
provide security and dissuade a potential attacker in case its deterrence fails.  However, 
India’s current and future missile defense platforms range from Indian, Soviet, Israeli, 
and Western built technologies produced over several decades.  And as India moves 
forward with its missile defense capabilities, it is expected to encounter difficulties in 
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integrating its vast array of different systems into its Command, Control, 
Communication, and Integration (C4I).134   
 
D. CONCLUSION  
The modernization efforts by the Indian military through the continuing 
development, upgrade and acquisition of platforms such as the Phalcon AWACS, 
surveillance and weapon locating radars, maritime surveillance aircraft, UAVs, satellites, 
the Su-30MKI, the Mirgae 2000-5, the Jaguar, the MiG-27, anti-tank guided and guided 
artillery weapons, the Rafael litening targeting pod, the Barak anti-missile missile and the 
Arrow anti-missile systems, the Greenpine radar system, the Antey 2500 ABM launchers, 
and the S-300 PMU air defense system 0---are helping India achieve a military edge over 
the country it has been to war with on three different occasions, Pakistan.  At the same 
time, the modernization is also helping bridge a quality gap between the Chinese military 
and the Indian military.  The motivations behind these efforts by the Indian military have 
been to neutralize a potential threat from Pakistan and to have even-standing against the 
Chinese military in a potential conflict in the Himalayas.  Another factor behind India’s 
drive for military modernization has been the success of the U.S. military during the 
Persian Gulf War due to its highly effective ISR, precision strike, and missile defense 
capabilities.  India wants to improve its ISR and precision strike capabilities, through the 
use of laser-guided and GPS systems, to improve its effects-based bombing, which allows 
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IV. PAKISTAN’S REACTIONS 
 The previous chapters outline India’s recent efforts to upgrade its intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike, and missile defense capabilities 
through indigenous development and foreign procurement.   These efforts have been 
motivated by lessons India learned during wars with both Pakistan and China.  However, 
given that Pakistan has a more extensive history of wars with India, and the two countries 
have been at a relatively high state of tensions with each other throughout their existence, 
Pakistan is likely to view India’s recent efforts as a threat to its security, which may result 
in increased instability in the region.  This chapter presents the advantages India’s 
military modernization confers upon it, along with Pakistan’s perception of these efforts, 
its likely reactions, and the overall effect this may have on the stability of the region  
 First, India’s military advantage over Pakistan is discussed, with specific regard to 
ISR, precision strike and missile defense capabilities.   Within ISR, India’s procurement 
of the Phalcon airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) and its space 
program development are presented.  For precision strike, India’s procurement of the Su-
30, the Mirage 2000, and the MiG-29 are discussed.  Finally, India’s pursuit and 
development of its missile defense capability and the subsequent repercussions for 
Pakistan also are evaluated. 
 
A. REGIONAL RIVALRY 
The current conflict between India and Pakistan is rooted in the historical and 
well-documented tensions between the region’s Hindu and Muslim factions.  The 
antecedents of the conflict began well before India’s independence and the creation of 
Pakistan in 1947.  Even during British rule of India, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the 
Muslim League expressed concern about the majority Hindu population in India.  Jinnah 
claimed that once the British left India, the Congress-led government would heavily favor 
the Hindu majority, to the detriment of the Muslim minority.  He believed that Hindu and 
Muslim populations could not live harmoniously together, and should be divided into two 
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separate nations.136   This belief culminated in the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and as a 
self proclaiming prophecy resulted in a war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir 
shortly after independence.  In total, the two countries have fought three wars against 
each other, as well as several skirmishes and incidents which risked escalation to full-out 
wars.    
 India went through an increase in military spending and equipment procurement 
in the 1960s and the 1980s.  Following the war with China in 1962, India recognized the 
need for a more robust military than it possessed at that time; and the procurement in the 
1980s was generally due to the necessity to replace the equipment that was bought in the 
1960s.  This was followed by a period of stagnation in the 1990s due to the fact that India 
experienced a major financial crisis in the early years of the 1990s, when India’s central 
government adapted economic reform policies.137   However, since the late 1990s, Indian 
military has returned to the policy of procuring and upgrading its equipment primarily 
due to the potential threat from China and Pakistan, from the lessons learned by the 
Indian military from their experience during the Kargil crisis, and from observing the 
success of the U.S. military during the Gulf War.  India’s increase in military spending is 
a direct, justifiable concern for Pakistan: nine of the 12 Indian Army Corps are deployed 
along the Line of Control (LOC) or against Pakistan, and over two-thirds of the India Air 
Force bases are concentrated in positions near Pakistan.138  
As discussed in Chapter III, India’s efforts to modernize and procure high-tech 
equipment seek to achieve the following goals: 1) to prepare itself for possible conflicts 
against China and/or Pakistan and; 2) to better consolidate its power in Kashmir.  In 
addition, India aspires to play an active and influential role in global affairs and does not 
want to be treated as a client state by the major powers, especially at a bilateral level.139   
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To achieve these goals, India has been upgrading its ISR, precision strike, and 
missile defense capabilities.  Chapter three elucidated India’s efforts to modernize and 
upgrade its Air Force’s ISR and precision strike capabilities, space program, and missile 
defense program through indigenous development and foreign procurement.  This 
modernization effort is not only responsible for a tangible increase in India’s military 
options, it is also causing a growing disparity between Indian and Pakistani conventional 
military capabilities.  This situation is further complicated by both countries’ acquisitions 
of nuclear weapons in 1998.  Because Pakistan cannot match India’s conventional 
military capability, the result of this growing divergence will be either a regional arms 
race and/or a decreased nuclear threshold for Pakistan. 
 
B. MILITARY DISPARITY 
 Indian military possesses a considerable advantage over the Pakistani military in 
both number of personnel and quality of equipment.  The Indian Army and Navy both 
exhibit approximately two times as much manpower as those of Pakistan, and the Indian 
Air Force has over three times the personnel as the Pakistani Air Force.140  The Indian 
Army also possesses better tanks as well as more advanced armored infantry fighting 
vehicles and superior artillery.  The Indian Army has a sizable inventory of T-72 and T-
90 tanks, compared to Pakistan’s relative small component of T-80UD and a few Al-
Khalid tanks.  Both the Indian Navy and Air Force possess significant inventory 
advantages over Pakistan, with approximately six times more equipment both services.  
Pakistan’s front line aircraft, the F-16, which is hampered by a lack of spare parts, would 
be unlikely to match India’s most advanced combat aircraft like the Su-30MK, Su-
30MKI, Mirage 2000, Jaguar, MiG-27 and MiG-29.141  Finally, has a distinct advantage 
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C. ISR 
 As discussed in Chapter III, in October 2003 India signed a trilateral deal with 
Russia and Israel, which enabled it to acquire the sophisticated Phalcon AWACS.  The 
Phalcon system possesses electronic support measures (ESM), electronics intelligence 
(ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), communications support and datalink 
management suites.142  The Israeli radar will be mounted on a Russian IL-76TD aircraft, 
and when India acquires the system, it will become the only country in the region to 
possess three AWACS.  With a phased-array radar system that provides surveillance, 
detection, and tracking to a radius of 370-400 km, India will have a clear operational 
edge over Pakistan and China.   
Pakistan’s initial reaction to India’s AWACS system will to be attempt to procure 
its own airborne early warning (AEW) system.  However, there is another option 
Pakistan could pursue, given that seeing further, deeper and in greater detail into an 
enemy’s territory does not necessarily confer an advantage.  It can, in fact, lead to greater 
chances of misunderstanding.  Pakistan’s Air Commodore (Retd.) Shahid Kamal Khan 
promotes the idea of capitalizing on this potential misunderstanding by developing and 
deploying a substantial arsenal of drones, decoy, spurious track generators, electronic 
emitters that duplicate radar signatures of strike aircraft - false targets and false alarms 
which will generate real engagements and real responses from the Indians.  He proposes 
employing cheap and plentiful triggers that will elicit expensive and complex solutions 
by the Indians.  The idea is that the Indians will respond to all the indicators they can now 
see due to their advanced AWACS technology, which will overwhelm their early 
warning systems and defenses.  This will lead the Indians to deplete their inventory and 
their will.143  This, however, is a dangerous and risky undertaking for two nations with 
nuclear capabilities.  Misunderstandings and over-reactions by one or both sides could 
potentially lead to disastrous consequences.   
 India’s space program is also a security concern for Pakistan.  The Indian Space 
Research Organization (ISRO) has developed the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles (PSLV) 
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and the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicles (GSLV) to launch satellites into 
space.  ISRO has been responsible for developing and launching several communication 
satellites, as well as the Technology Experiment Satellite (TES).  The TES reportedly 
carries a one meter high-resolution imaging camera, capable of sensitive defense 
surveillance applications, which would enable India to detect and identify significant 
military targets.144   
India also has signed various agreements with Israel to cooperate in space 
research.  In the near future, India will be using satellites for military communications, 
surveillance, navigation and also for early warning.  According to the Chief of Indian Air 
Staff, S. Krishnaswamy: “work had begun to have [laser] weapon platforms in space”.145  
The model is inspired, in part, by the U.S. use of space-based assets to guide long-range 
precision firepower in the recent offensive against al-Qaida in Afghanistan.  In addition, 
the Indian Air Force’s relatively successful employment of laser-guided bombs during 
the Kargil crisis is a further encouragement for the space-based weapons program.146  
In order to achieve similar retaliatory means, Pakistan may choose to engage 
India in a “space arms-race.”  Alternatively, Pakistan may also engage in ever increasing 
production and deployment of missiles – on aircraft, in hardened silos, or road-mobile 
vehicles – in order to ensure that an offensive force would be able to survive a pre-
emptive Indian attack.   
However, India’s increasing capability to target Pakistan’s strategic assets from 
space will leave Pakistan with virtually no recourse other than nuclear retaliation.  
Pakistan is aware that it cannot risk having its strategic targets destroyed by India’s 
superior conventional and space resources.  Currently, there is an “ugly stability” that 
prevails between Indian and Pakistani conventional forces.  A relative military parity 
forces India to respect Pakistan’s military capability to inflict reciprocal damage, which 
discourages India from launching an attack against Pakistan without unacceptable losses.  
 
144 M.V.Ramana, R. Rajaraman, and Z. Mian, “Nuclear Early Warning in South Asia,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 17 January 2004, accessed on the internet on 17 February 2005. 
145 Staff Correspondent. “IAF Working on Weapon Platforms in Space.” The Hindu 07 October 2003, 
accessed on the internet at www.thehindu.com/2003/10/07/stories/2003100703041200.htm 
146 Vinod Anand, “Future Battlespace and Need for Jointmanship,” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 10 
(January 2000), 1. 
 54
                                                
This has led to a sense of security for Pakistan.  However, if India achieves a real military 
advantage over Pakistan, that is to say that India could achieve significant strategic goals 
through military operations against Pakistan with minimal losses to its own forces, this 
sense of security for Pakistan may vanish and force Pakistan to lower its nuclear 
threshold in order to discourage India from launching an attack against Pakistan’s 
strategic assets.  Therefore, an increased Indian military capability is likely to lead 
Pakistan to lower its nuclear threshold and place greater emphasis on its nuclear arsenal.   
 
D. PRECISION STRIKE 
The Indian Air Force, considered to be a modern, technology-intensive service, 
has evolved into the fourth largest air force in the world.  Its recent acquisitions, 
specifically the Su-30 and the Hawk trainers, have provided the Indian Air Force (IAF) 
with a present generation air defense fleet and are helping improve the skill of the IAF 
pilots.  By 2010 or 2015, the IAF aims to become a “lean, mean force” through a 
combination of acquisitions and upgrading of existing platforms capable of delivering 
increased firepower with beyond visual range (BVR) missiles and precision-guided 
munitions.147
In recent years, the IAF has shifted from a confined, tactical role that primarily 
provided ground-force support, to a more strategic and independent role.  This has largely 
been accomplished by the addition of Mirage 2000 and Su-30MKI aircraft, which 
provide concentrated strike capability deep within enemy territory.  The addition of the 
Su-30MKI essentially gives India air superiority over Pakistan, providing it with both 
pre-emption and swift retaliation capability, in addition to the deep strike and interdiction 
capability.  The Su-30 MKI will be a valuable asset for India’s conventional and strategic 
strike capability.  India received its first shipment of Su-30s in 2002 and in 2004 India’s 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is scheduled to commence license production of 
the aircraft.   
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To further enhance its strategic depth and operational capability, India has 
acquired mid-air refuellers.  This force multiplier will provide the IAF an ability to 
maintain longer on-station patrols and the ability to reach further inside enemy territory. 
Along with the Su-30MKI India also possesses the MiG-29s.  Both of these 
aircraft are capable of carrying the AA-12 Adder missiles, which have BVR capability, 
and will give India a significant tactical advantage over the Pakistani Air Force.  The AA-
12 Adder is a medium-range, radar-guided, air-to-air missile with a range of 
approximately 75 km.  The Adder has been compared to the American AIM-120 
AMRAAM due to its similarities in appearance and likely performance.   
According to fighter analyst Benjamin Lambeth, as quoted in Jane’s “Whoever 
has the longest reach controls the engagement.”148  Combined with its range, the 
missile’s inertial, command, and active radar guidance systems essentially defines the 
depth of the air battle.  The BVR advantage will allow the IAF pilots to maneuver 
without fear of engagement against the Pakistani Air Force pilots – a tactical advantage in 
an air-to-air engagement against which the Pakistani Air Force currently does not have a 
response.   
India’s increased deep strike and BVR capability, combined with Pakistan’s lack 
of defensive depth puts all of Pakistan’s aircraft and airfields within range of Indian air 
attack.  Additionally, India’s recent acquisition of low-key U.S. smart-bomb technology 
makes Pakistani air bases particularly vulnerable.149
In one possible outcome, the situation becomes a precursor for an arms race, 
which may escalate out-of-control.  In an effort to establish parity, Pakistan may be 
forced to procure similar BVR technology.  India, in turn, may attempt to regain the 





148 Bill Sweetman, “Fighter Tactics”, Janes International Defence Review – June 01, 2001, on Janes 
website, www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp 
149 IISS, The Military Balance for 2002-2003, 137. 
 56
                                                
In another outcome, Pakistan may be forced to rely more heavily on its nuclear 
arsenal.  Given its limitations and India’s ability to disable Pakistani aircraft on the air 
fields, Pakistan is likely to increase its nuclear deterrent to high alert since it must now 
fear the possibility of successful Indian preemptive air attacks.150
 
E. MISSILE DEFENSE 
According to Indian defense analyst C. Raja Mohan, President Bush has made a 
political alliance that favors strategic partnership with India.  This partnership will lead to 
an enhanced flow of advanced technologies from the United States to India.  At the core 
of this issue is the ‘quartet of issues’ – peaceful uses of nuclear energy, civilian space 
program, liberalization of the transfer of dual use technologies, and missile defense.  
India is interested in acquiring weapons systems from the United States along with a 
broad range of defense technologies.  As India and the United States move closer to 
signing a high technology pact, India is potentially going to gain U.S. know-how in 
several fields, including defense, space, and missile defense technologies.  The U.S. 
officials have acknowledged India’s missile defense program, stating, “[w]e are aware 
that India’s missile defence ambition is part of its no-first-use policy”.151   
An improved U.S. and Indian relationship, which includes transfer of 
technologies, is a great security concern for Pakistan.  Assistance from the United States 
will lead to increased Indian military capability, which in turn will result in greater 
potential threat to Pakistan via the Indian military.  This will most likely force Pakistan to 
pursue relationships and alliances with other nations in an effort to procure more 
advanced military equipment and retaliatory measures.   
 Having developed its own range of ballistic missiles, India has recently begun to 
seek a missile defense system that will neutralize, or at least minimize, the Pakistani 
nuclear threat.  India’s defense research and development organization (DRDO) has 
pursued foreign collaboration with Israel and Russia to provide India with its first anti-
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tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system.152   In order to develop an ATBM system, the 
DRDO has tried to procure the Russian S-300 SAM ATBM system, which is similar to 
the U.S. Patriot system, and as of October 2003 was negotiating to procure the Israeli 
Arrow anti-missile system, which is developed by Israel in cooperation with the United 
States.   
 India’s efforts to acquire integrated air defense and ATBM systems are likely to 
lead to a “missile arms race” in South Asia.  A sophisticated air defense system with anti-
missile capabilities would potentially offset Pakistan’s reliance on its ballistic missiles 
and tactical strike aircraft, like the F-16 and Mirage III, as the primary nuclear capable 
delivery systems.  India’s continued ATBM improvements could erode Pakistan’s 
confidence in its current nuclear deterrent.  To compensate, Pakistan may adopt a nuclear 
launch-on-warning posture, and begin to vastly increase its nuclear arsenal and delivery 
systems, in an attempt to saturate India’s air defenses.153   
 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
 India’s military modernization efforts are providing it with distinct advantages 
over Pakistan, and widening the gap between the two countries’ military abilities.  An 
increased ISR capability enables it to successfully locate targets inside Pakistan, 
including its nuclear arsenal.  An improving precision strike arsenal provides India with 
the ability to launch an attack – either pre-emptive or retaliatory – against targets inside 
Pakistan with a high degree of success.  And obtaining a missile defense will provide 
India with the capability to defend itself against potential nuclear strikes from Pakistan.  
From Pakistan’s perspective, India can locate Pakistan’s nuclear weapons with its 
improved ISR capability, launch a preemptive strike to target Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal 
with a high degree of success with its precision strike weapons, and defend itself with its 
missile defense capability against a retaliatory nuclear strike that Pakistan may be able to 
launch with nuclear weapons that India may have missed on its initial strike.  As a 
security concern for Pakistan, this may be a scenario that India may be willing to pursue.  
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A possible avenue for Pakistan to pursue under this scenario would be to increase its 
nuclear arsenal in order to survive an attack on its nuclear weapons and still maintain 
enough weapons to saturate India’s missile defense.    
The Indian Armed Forces’ superiority in strength and technological capabilities 
pose a serious threat to Pakistan’s security as well.  In light of India’s growing 
conventional military superiority, Pakistan, in an effort to achieve a strategic balance, 
launched its nuclear program to establish a deterrent against India and to compensate for 
India’s conventional military advantages.154   
After India conducted a series of nuclear tests in May of 1998, Pakistan followed 
suit by conducting its own nuclear tests.  Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear weapon tests likely 
were seen by Islamabad as a necessary response to India’s nuclear tests, and as a means 
of bolstering its own deterrent.  Pakistan is driven by its perceived need to counter India’s 
conventional superiority and nuclear capability and remains fearful of India’s regional 
and global power aspirations.  This has led Pakistan to pursue and maintain close security 
ties with China as a balance.155   
By rejecting the “no first use” policy, Pakistan implicitly advocates nuclear threat 
as a viable deterrent.  Pakistan’s objective in rejecting the “no first use” policy is to deter 
India from launching a conventional war, because Pakistan recognizes its disadvantage in 
the conventional warfare arena.  This view was expressed by Pakistani President Pervez 
Musharraf, as quoted in Abidi’s article Threat Reduction in South Asia: “[n]o sane person 
in normal conditions can ever even contemplate going into a non-conventional war, but 
basically the best guarantee is to avoid conflict.”156  To this end, Abidi quotes President 
Musharraf as having stated, “the conventional balance is South Asia is extremely 
important to maintain peace in the region.”157   
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However, the conventional military capabilities gap between India and Pakistan is 
likely to continue to grow due to India’s growing purchasing power and its efforts to 
continue procurement for the foreseeable future.  And as India’s conventional military 
capabilities increase compared to Pakistan’s, it will allow India to conduct successful 
preemptive strikes against Pakistan.  For example, as India’s ISR and precision strike 
capabilities increase, they will provide India with the ability to conduct suppression of 
enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations, followed up with bombing attacks escorted by 
fighter aircraft and supported by AWACS, against Pakistan’s high value assets (HVAs).  
This improved ISR capability through the application of AWACS will allow a quick 
response engagement by Indian fighter aircraft to Pakistan’s response to Indian intrusion.  
Once Pakistan’s air defenses, ground and air based, have been neutralized, Indian 
bombers will be able to conduct unhindered and effective bombing operations against 
Pakistan’s strategic targets with precision guided bombs, which will ensure high 
probability of destruction.  
Given the current gap between the two countries’ conventional military 
capabilities, as well as India’s current trend of procurement and upgrading programs, it is 
unlikely Pakistan will be able to maintain sufficient conventional deterrent to prevent 
India from orchestrating a successful pre-emptive strike against Pakistan. 
 In summary, the net effect of significant Indian development and procurement 
programs has been to drastically alter the military balance in India’s favor.158  If India 
continues to modernize and upgrade its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense 
capabilities, maintains a significant conventional advantage over Pakistan, and persists 
with acquisition at the current pace, Pakistan will have to either enter into an arms race to 
increase its conventional military capabilities, or continue to rely on its nuclear weapons, 
with the option to initiate a nuclear strike as the main deterrent against an Indian 
aggression.  In such a climate, a regional arms race may eventually lead to a “hair-
trigger”  posture  toward  the  nuclear  arsenal.   Rather  than  provide  security  to  India,  
 
158 Abidi, “Threat Reduction,” 10. 
 60
achieving a significantly superior conventional military force over Pakistan may, 
paradoxically, cause greater instability in the region, and, in a worst case scenario 








                                                
V. EFFECTS ON THE STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA 
India’s concerted effort to upgrade its intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike, and missile defense capabilities is a direct result of 
regional power competition with China and Pakistan.  Pakistan is particularly likely to 
view these efforts as threatening, and may be compelled to take actions that will lead to 
greater insecurity in the region.  This chapter summarizes the arguments presented in 
previous chapters, which evaluate India’s modernization and Pakistan’s possible 
reactions, and also presents an explanation, based on the realism argument, for the 
continuing hostilities between India and Pakistan.  According to this argument the 
persistent tensions between India and Pakistan are predominantly because of Pakistan’s 
sense of insecurity due to the imbalance of power between the two states.       
India views China as both an economic competitor and as a rival for regional 
power.  The Indian government believes that as China’s economic capabilities grow, so 
do its superpower aspirations, which could cause a major shift in the region’s power 
balance and threaten India’s national security.159  To prevent a future confrontation with 
China, India has entered a period of military modernization; it plans to use its 
increasingly capable military as a diplomatic tool, encouraging China to pursue bilateral 
talks while avoiding military confrontation.  Hence, India views its military 
modernization as an avenue to negotiations against what it perceives as its primary long-
term future adversary. 
 Pakistan, however, is a slightly different case.  India and Pakistan have a long, 
extensive history of conflicts, and there have been tensions between the two countries 
since their inception in 1947.  Pakistan believes that India has aspirations to militarily 
“re-unite”  the  two  countries,  and  cites  the  positioning  of nine of the 12 Indian Army  
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Corps along the Line of Control (LOC) or against Pakistan, and the concentration of over 
two-thirds of the Indian Air Force bases near Pakistan as examples of India’s aggressive 
intent.160   
In contrast, Indians perceive Pakistan as an unstable country that has been through 
several military coups and government overthrows and views Pakistan’s military 
dominated government to be spending a disproportionately high amount of money on its 
military.  Having an undemocratic neighbor with the military at the helm will continue to 
be a concern for India.161   
To prevent future wars with either China or Pakistan, Indians believe they need to 
possess the military capability to be able to dissuade and deter their potential adversaries.  
In order to accomplish this, India has undertaken efforts to modernize its ISR, precision 
strike, and missile defense capabilities through both indigenous development and 
acquisitions of foreign weapons systems.  To improve its ISR capabilities, India is 
focusing on the Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), surveillance 
radars, weapon locating radars, maritime surveillance aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), and satellites.  For precision strike, India’s efforts are geared towards acquiring 
the Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000-5, upgrading the Jaguar and the MiG-27, acquiring and 
developing anti-tank guided weapon systems, guided artillery weapons, multi-purpose 
guided weapons, and the Rafael litening targeting pod.  To develop an anti-missile 
defense capability, India is focusing on the Barak anti-missile missile system, Greenpine 
anti-missile system, Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile launchers, and the S-300 PMU air 
defense system.  These systems are expected to provide India with the ability to dissuade 
and deter its potential attackers by achieving a military edge over Pakistan and by helping 
bridge a quality gap between China.  The modern technology is expected to improve 
India’s capabilities to survey the potential threats to its security and respond to them in a 
timely, effective, and efficient manner.  Additionally, India’s future missile defense 
capability is expected to protect against potential nuclear attacks.   
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India’s increased military spending has been a direct concern for Pakistan, and it 
is likely to view India’s recent modernization efforts as a threat to its security.  India’s 
military modernization program has led to a growing disparity between the Indian and 
Pakistani conventional military capabilities, shifting the balance of power toward India.  
If India pursues its policy to achieve technical superiority in ISR, precision targeting and 
missile defense, it will be able to effectively locate and efficiently destroy strategically 
important targets in Pakistan and congruently defend against an incoming strike from 
Pakistan.  However, as the military disparity between the two countries increases and 
India gains greater capability to launch a successful preventive strike against Pakistan, 
Pakistan is likely to engage India in a low-level conflict as predicted by the strategic 
stability/tactical instability paradox.  The result of this growing divergence in the two 
countries’ conventional capabilities will be either a regional arms race and/or a lowering 
of the nuclear threshold for Pakistan, and greater instability in the region.  Instead of 
providing greater security, at least in the near-term, India’s continuing improvement and 
modernization of its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities is likely to 
lead to greater instability in the region.  Hence, India’s efforts to increase its security will 
ironically lead to a greater threat to its security. 
It is also important to recognize that India’s growing military needs are not just 
threat oriented.  For over ten years, India has had one of the fastest growing economies in 
the world.  This economic growth has brought concomitant issues: increased trade means 
increased vulnerabilities that need to be protected, such as energy sources and commerce 
routes.  The increase in GDP also has led to an increase in the overall defense budget 
(even though as a percent of GDP the defense budget has stayed consistently below 3 
percent, with the 2003-2004 budget at 2.4 percent of GDP).162  India also has aspirations 
to  play  a  more  dominant  role  in world affairs; establishing greater influence in its own  
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region is a first step in attaining higher status and influence on a larger scale.  For all 
these reasons, Indians believe they must have a military commensurate with the size and 
economy of the country.163
 
A. BANDWAGON OR BALANCE? 
Pakistan essentially has two options, either bandwagon with India (as some of the 
other smaller neighbors of India have done) or balance against India.  Among Indian 
policy makers, there is a school of thought that believes Pakistan has no other option than 
to bandwagon with India.164  The reality is that India has the industrial base and 
purchasing power to develop and procure sophisticated military equipment; Pakistan 
cannot keep pace with India’s growing economy, and therefore cannot match its military 
spending.  The consequences of another conflict between India and Pakistan are serious: 
“if Pakistan misinterprets India’s actions and takes military actions against India, then 
Pakistan will have to deal with the consequences of India’s response.”165  A Pakistan that 
chooses to bandwagon may be a possibility in the long-term, however, over the next ten 
to 20 years as Pakistan is threatened by India’s growth (economic and military) its 
response is likely to produce destabilizing affects.  An alliance between the two countries 
remains, at the moment, a distant possibility. 
For now Pakistan has chosen to balance against India, since it is a relatively 
stronger state than some of the other neighbors of India.  This is in line with the Realist 
argument that when possible, a state is expected to balance rather than bandwagon, since 
it is assumed that states want to maintain their autonomy: “[S]tates facing an external 
threat overwhelmingly prefer to balance against the threat rather than bandwagon with it.  
This is primarily because an alignment that preserves most of a state’s freedom of action 
is preferable to accepting subordination under a potential hegemon.”166
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Pakistan has attempted to balance against India through internal capabilities and 
through external help from other states (mainly China and the United States).167  
Pakistan’s internal efforts, based on GNP and defense budgets that are far inferior to 
India’s, cannot sufficiently achieve balance, and it will continue to seek external aide in 
the form of military assistance. 
The situation has a long precedent in Pakistan; as Prime Minister Bogra said in 
1954, regarding an alliance with the United States: “[a]t present, we can’t get a 
settlement, mainly because India has greater military strength…When there is more 
equality of military strength, then I am sure that there will be greater chance of 
settlement.”168  Pakistan pursued an alliance with the United States even though talks 
between Nehru and Ali were heading towards resolutions of disputes, including Kashmir.  
Nehru had warned Ali against any such alliance and withdrew from the talks following 
the announcement of a defense treaty between the United States and Pakistan.  This 
shows that Pakistan is motivated by the need to balance against India.  While the 
resolution of disputes was important to Pakistan, resolution alone would not have 
removed the imbalance of power between the two countries: “Because Pakistan’s 
insecurity was tied to the power imbalance in South Asia rather than to specific disputes 
with India, Pakistan saw greater security in a defence treaty with the US, even if the 
pursuit of such a treaty put at risk its the negotiations with India over Kashmir.”169
India saw its concessions towards Pakistan during the settlements following the 
1965 and 1971 wars, at Tashkent and Simla, as generous.  However, Pakistan failed to 
live up to them primarily because neither of these agreements solved the fundamental 
issue of the overwhelming imbalance of power between the two countries.  Pakistan, in 
fact, emphasized the importance of balancing India in the post-war period.  Following the 
Tashkent agreement, Pakistan attempted to build its relations with the Soviet Union in an 
attempt to wean it away from India; and after the 1971 war, Pakistan began its atomic 
weapons program.  Both of these efforts by Pakistan were aimed at correcting the 
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imbalance between the two countries.170  Irrespective of how well negotiations may be 
going between the two countries over a dispute or how conciliatory India may have been 
towards Pakistan, Pakistan has always opted for the option to try and balance against 
India.   
 
B. FOR THE POLICYMAKERS  
The India–Pakistan conflict can be seen as a direct consequence to the imbalance 
of power between the two states and Pakistan’s perception of the threat due to this 
imbalance.  Hence, the more India obtains sophisticated military equipment and the 
greater the gap widens, the more threatened Pakistan will become and the more actions it 
will take in order to increase its security.  “The persistence of the conflict is a 
consequence of the persistence of this imbalance and of Pakistan’s attempts to correct 
it.”171  And this will lead to greater instability in the region.   
 The Indian Armed Forces’ superiority has driven Pakistan to explore options to 
strategically balance India.  This led Pakistan to pursue a nuclear weapons program: 
“Pakistan launched its nuclear program to establish a deterrent against India and to 
compensate for India’s conventional military advantages”.172  This is one example of a 
drastic measure that Pakistan has employed to maintain parity with India and to bolster its 
own deterrent. 
 Pakistan remains fearful of India’s regional and global power aspirations and has 
maintained close security ties with China in an effort to balance India’s conventional 
superiority and nuclear capability.  Pakistan has procured several weapon systems from 
China and will likely continue to do so as long as the Indian military retains its current 
advantage.  If India continues its build-up and upgrading of its military equipment, 
Pakistan will have to either enter into an arms race and increase its conventional military 
capabilities or continue to rely on its nuclear weapons as a deterrent strategy.  Rather than 
provide security for India, achieving a significantly superior conventional military force 
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over Pakistan may, paradoxically, lead to an escalating arms race, regional 
destabilization, and potentially even a nuclear war. 
 In order to successfully engage India and Pakistan, United States policymakers 
must understand the effects that India’s military modernization may have in the region.  
The goal for the U.S. government should be to decrease the conventional military 
imbalance between India and Pakistan in order to minimize Pakistan’s perceived threat.  
This would promote stability by raising the nuclear threshold for Pakistan.   
Effective U.S. policy should be derived from a strong understanding of the 
historical tensions between the two countries.  After nearly sixty years of the India-
Pakistan conflict, its most salient characteristic is its persistence.  Resolutions of specific 
disputes have frequently given way to renewed disputes; for example, both the Indus 
river dispute and the conflict over the Rann of Kutch were resolved in the 1960s, yet 
neither resolution had a lasting impact on India-Pakistan relations.  During the past 
decades, the tension between the two nations has taken various forms, including disputes 
over the rivers, fishing rights, Bangladesh, the Siachen Glacier, and Kashmir, to name 
just a few.  The multiplicity of disagreements suggests that the disputes themselves are 
only symptoms of a deeper conflict between the two countries.173  
In their dealings with India and Pakistan, U.S. policymakers should understand 
that the main cause of the India-Pakistan conflict is the imbalance of power between the 
two countries, and Pakistan’s resulting insecurity due to this imbalance.  As long as 
Pakistan is attempting to correct this imbalance, the conflict will continue.174
Basic demographic information reveals the extent of the imbalance in population, 
economic, and military terms.  India’s population is over six times than that of Pakistan, 
its economy is more than six times larger, and its defense budget is several times larger, 
which coupled with a higher GNP, allow India to meet its defense burden with greater 
ease.  India’s military force is twice the size of Pakistan’s and is also qualitatively 
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superior.  The imbalance of power is overwhelmingly in favor of India, which has driven 
Pakistan to undertake frantic balancing efforts.175
Because the United States has a vested economic, military and political interest in 
South Asian stability, it should seek to promote a balance of power between India and 
Pakistan.  This is especially complicated since the United States wants to bolster India’s 
technology capabilities as a long-term balance against China’s growing capabilities, and 
since it is unrealistic to presume that the United States can prevent India from procuring 
or developing advanced military equipment, due to India’s growing purchasing power 
and industrial base.  Therefore, in order to prevent a near-term India-Pakistan conflict, the 
United States should support the procurement of military hardware for Pakistan, which 
would allow it to keep pace with India’s qualitative capabilities.  Sharing space 
technology with India is a long-term perspective, which do not pose an immediate threat 
to Pakistan, and should be continued.  However, assets such as fighter aircraft and 
AWACS are an immediate concern to Pakistan, and the United States should attempt to 
maintain parity of such assets between the two countries.  Since India has obtained the 
Su-30 aircraft from Russia, the United States should approve the sale of F-16s to 
Pakistan.  This will provide Pakistan with an advanced fighter capability and a potential 
to counter India’s increasing air superiority over Pakistan.  India’s procurement of the 
AWACS will give it a significant ISR advantage over Pakistan, and to counter this 
advantage and to ease Pakistan’s sense of vulnerability the United States should sell 
similar technology to Pakistan.  This would be a significant step towards decreasing 
Pakistan’s sense of insecurity by providing it with a capability that would allow a rapid 
and efficient response to an Indian air attack by effectively managing and coordinating 
the air-to-air battle.   
If Pakistan does not obtain an airborne early warning (AEW) capability, it may 
pursue an avenue such as the one recommended by Pakistan’s Air Commodore (Retd.) 
Shahid Kamal Khan.  His recommendation is to substantially increase its arsenal of 
drones, decoy, spurious track generators, and electronic emitters that duplicate radar 
signatures of strike aircraft, in order to generate false alarms that will generate real 
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responses and lead to the depletion of Indian inventory and will.176  This, however, is a 
dangerous and risky undertaking for two nations with nuclear capabilities.  
Misunderstandings and over-reactions by one or both sides could potentially lead to 
disastrous consequences.  A significant military disparity can lead to an unstable regional 
arms race as Pakistan procures more nuclear weapons in efforts to compensate for India’s 
growing conventional advantage, and lowers its nuclear threshold in order to deter India, 
resulting in an overall increased instability in the region.  
If India continues its military modernization, increasing the military capabilities 
gap between itself and Pakistan, it will lead to greater Pakistani insecurity and Pakistan 
will continue to attempt to correct the imbalance of power.  This will lead to greater 
instability in the region.  An effective U.S. policy should diligently address this 
imbalance of power, which will address and likely resolve the historical conflicts 
between India and Pakistan, and prevent regional destabilization.    Decreasing the 
significant military capabilities gap between the two countries may be the best option for 
attaining diplomatic peace. 
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